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Abstract 
We ask whether firms hedge optimally by analyzing the impact the NYSE/NASDAQ listing 
rule changes have had, which exogenously imposed board composition changes on a subset of 
firms, on financial risk management. Using new proxies for the extent of financial risk 
management in non-financial firms we find that treated firms reduce their financial hedging, 
in a difference-in-difference framework. The reduction is concentrated in firms with higher 
conflicts of interests, such as a high CEO equity ownership level, which exposes them to more 
idiosyncratic risk, and a higher occurrence of option backdating. We reject the hypothesis that 
newly majority-independent boards reduce financial hedging due to a lack of knowledge. 
First, we find no difference in financial hedging for firms where SOX mandated the addition 
of a financial expert relative to those that already had such expertise. Second, shareholder 
value increases more during the period of time of the listing rule deliberations for treated 
firms that hedge prior to the treatment. We conclude that some firms hedge too much 
reducing shareholder value potentially to the benefit of under-diversified CEOs. We also 
show that board independence serves to reinforce monitoring which allows boards to cut back 
on excessive financial hedging. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
A large literature on risk management suggests that firms should benefit from 
managing risks.1 Consistent with this prediction, Allayannis and Weston (2001) find 
an average 5% value premium for firms hedging currency risk. However, agency 
problems could lead managers to make suboptimal hedging choices. For example, 
Tufano (1996) concludes that managerial risk preferences are important determinants 
of the extent of risk management in the gold mining industry. Similar evidence is 
shown in Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) and Graham and Rogers, (2002) for other 
non-financial firms. They find that CEOs with more equity ownership hedge more.  
Kumar and Rabinovitch, (2012) find that firms with more agency problems hedge 
more. Thus, while the average firm seems to benefit from hedging, it is unclear 
whether firms hedge optimally.  
On the one hand it is possible that firms optimally design compensation and 
ownership of their management to induce optimal hedging, e.g., the board provides 
more equity ownership to managers in order to induce more hedging. On the other 
hand, risk management could be affected by side effects of compensation policies or 
remaining agency problems. Given the possible simultaneity of determining 
governance and risk management, we ask whether an exogenous change to the 
independence of the board of directors affects risk management and if such a change 
in risk management is value enhancing or destroying for shareholders.  
We exploit the new listing rule imposed by NYSE and NASDAQ in 2003 
requiring firms to have a majority of independent directors on the ir board. In a 
difference- in-difference framework similar to Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and 
Guthrie et al (2012) we compare treated firms (those who need to change the board) 
to control firms (those that already had a majority of independent directors on their 
board) in terms of the extent of risk management and associated value changes.   
In order to measure the extent of risk management, we introduce several new 
proxies based on hedge accounting data and word count measures. Prior research has 
used notional value of hedges reported in 10-K reports (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 
2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002) as a proxy for the extent of risk management. 
Unfortunately, FAS133 introduced in 2000 does not require the reporting of notional 
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 Research shows that hedging is valuable to the extent that tax payments (Smith and Stu lz, 1985), 
financial d istress costs (Stulz, 1984), in formation asymmetry costs (Stulz, 1990; De Marzo  and Duffie, 
1991; Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998), and financing costs (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993;  
Morellec and Smith, 2002) can be reduced. 
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value of hedges anymore. However, for all firms which still disclose the notional 
value – about one third of our sample firms – we document high correlations with our 
new hedging measures. We create a first proxy of financial hedging based on hedge 
accounting data available starting from 2001 that records unrealized gains and losses 
from financial hedging which offset variations in future cash flow. For example, a 
long position in a commodity forward contract maturing in a future period (e.g. oil) 
may increase in value if the underlying has increased. However, future operating 
expenses (e.g., fuel costs) would increase in lockstep. Hedge accounting treatment 
delays recognition of the gain on the commodity contract to the period in which the 
underlying cost is incurred, at which point they will be netted out in that period‟s 
profits2. An advantage of using hedge accounting numbers is that we get an estimate 
of the quantitative importance of hedging. A limitation with using hedge accounting 
information as a proxy for the extent of financial risk management is that firms may 
hedge but not record it as hedge accounting.3 We create a second proxy that casts a 
wider net. The proxy is based on counting words related to financial hedging in 10-K 
statements. We use financial hedging terms from Campello et al (2011) and Graham 
and Rogers (2002). In a third proxy we extend this word- list based upon reading 10-K 
statements of a few high profile hedging firms (e.g., Southwest Airlines) to include 
detailed expressions of financial hedging contracts. Fourth and fifth, we create 
focused interest rate and exchange rate hedging proxies to address concerns that 
general hedging terms such as „option contract‟ could also be used in describing 
compensation arrangements. The assumption of these proxies is that firms which use 
more of these financial hedging expressions are more actively managing risk using 
financial hedges. We create a last proxy by searching 10-K statements for expressions 
that reflect risk management organizations and functions (e.g., Chief Risk Officer).  
While this proxy is expected to be positively correlated with the extent of risk 
                                                 
2
 Cash-flow hedges include derivatives used to hedge exposure to expected future cash flows that are 
attributable to a particu lar risk and may relate to existing assets or liabilities as well as to forecasted 
transactions (SFAS No. 133). Thus, our p roxy Compustat Item AOCIDERGL captures commodit ies, 
foreign currency exchange rate and interest rate hedges designated as cash -flow hedges. 
3
 For example, “fair value” hedges – protecting against fluctuations of assets (or liabilities) that are on a 
company‟s balance sheet – may not be included in our Compustat proxy. Based on a survey, Lins, 
Servaes, and Tamayo (2011) find that fair value accounting for hedges has significantly affected 42% 
of the responding firms  in  how they hedge. They document  a reduction in option based hedging but no 
effect on linear contracts . Furthermore, “natural” or “economic” hedges will not be classified as hedge 
accounting (see Mulford and Comiskey, 2009). 
 3 
management on average, an increase could indicate more monitoring or more 
hedging.  
In the difference- in-difference analysis, we find a significant reduction in the 
extent of financial risk management for treated firms relative to control firms. 
Economically, we find that treated firms relative to control firms display a reduction 
in the absolute value of unrealized gains and losses (standardized by lagged book 
value of assets) of 21% around the time of the listing rule change.4 We also find that 
the number of words related to financial hedging decreases by between 9% and 36% 
depending on the measure used. However, treated firms show a marginally significant 
increase in the number of words related to the risk management policy and functions. 
Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that a board independence 
requirement reduces financial hedging but increases discussions about risk 
management policy and functions.  
However, a simple explanation could be that the treated firms decided to reduce 
the risk in their business. Since our hedging variables do not capture exposure, it is 
possible that firms would need less financial hedging because they reduced risk. If 
this was the case, we would expect equity volatility to decrease for treated firms 
(relative to control firms). However, in a difference- in-difference analysis we find that 
total equity volatility, and in particular idiosyncratic volatility, increases for treated 
firms. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the interpretation that treated 
firms reduce hedging, leaving more risk to be borne by equity holders. Our findings 
complement those of Guay (1999) and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2011), who 
found that the introduction of hedging reduced equity volatility. Furthermore, we 
directly test whether treated firms lower the level of operating risks by studying 
changes in corporate policies. We find no significant treatment effects on policies like 
firm-diversification, leverage, cash holding or investment.  
 Given the reduction in financial hedging induced by the mandated board 
change, we ask whether this change is value enhancing or destroying for shareholders.  
First, the newly majority independent board may not have the expertise to manage 
risk, and thus may cut back on hedging for lack of understanding. We call this the 
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 Guay and Kothari (2003) find that among a subsample of large, non-financial firms the amount of 
cash flow and value hedged using financial derivatives is small. However, their estimates are based on 
informat ion in 10-K statements prior to the new hedge accounting rules. It is thus possible that our 
finding of larger unrealized gains and losses due to hedging might be affected by the new reporting 
requirements.  
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„knowledge hypothesis‟. Alternatively, the „monitoring hypothesis‟ posits that power 
will shift towards the independent directors on the board, who will cut back on 
excessive hedging that is not in the interest of shareholders.  
To test the „knowledge hypothesis‟ we use a second, exogenous board rule 
change imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) – whereby firms were required to 
have a financial expert on the audit committee – to explore whether treated firms 
(with newly independent boards) which also had to add a financial expert saw any 
reduction in risk management. Both Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2012) and 
Cunat and Garicano (2010) find evidence that financial expertise at the board level 
mattered for risk management in financial firms, albeit with opposite effects.5  In a 
difference- in-difference analysis, we find no significant difference in financial 
hedging among treated firms (newly independent boards) which are also obligated to 
add a financial expert. 6   Furthermore, we find that treated firms increase their 
reporting about risk management organization and functions relative to control firms. 
Hence, it seems unlikely that the reduction in financial hedging is primarily the result 
of adding new, independent directors without sufficient knowledge to properly 
oversee financial hedging policies or operations. 
To test the monitoring hypothesis, we split the treated firms (board 
independence shock) into two groups: those with ex-ante higher agency problems and 
those with lower problems. Firms with a CEO who has above sample median equity 
ownership are classified as „high agency problem‟ firms. The reason for this 
somewhat unusual classification is that such CEOs have a higher exposure to the 
firm‟s idiosyncratic risk, a risk not priced in the market by diversified shareholders 
but to which the CEOs are nonetheless exposed.7 We find that such firms display a 
significant reduction in financial hedging, consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. 
                                                 
5
 Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2012) documented an increase in risk-taking by financially  literate 
independent boards during the financial crisis. Studying Spanish banks, Cun at and Garicano (2010) 
found that a lack of financial knowledge on the board lowered the quality of the loans and their 
performance. While both papers investigate the link between boards, risk, and performance, neither 
shows a direct effect on risk management. Beyond the focus on board quality only, Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2012) analyze 75 US bank hold ing companies and create a risk management ranking. They find that 
banks with better rankings in 2006 were less exposed to subprime -mortgage loans and performed better 
during the crisis. However, their paper does not show a link between board expertise and risk 
management ranking. 
6
 However, there is some ev idence that firms which did not have a financial expert on the audit 
committee in  2002 did hedge less throughout the sample period, consistent with board skills being 
selected endogenously.  
7
 Klein‟s (2002) finding that higher CEO ownership is (weakly) associated with more earnings 
management is consistent with the interpretation that higher CEO ownership can indicate higher 
conflicts of interest. 
 5 
This finding is consistent with Tufano (1996) and Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) 
that find firms with high CEO equity exposure hedge more and add that this might be 
evidence of suboptimal hedging.8 
When we split the sample according to whether boards have received backdated 
option grants (following Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010) as a proxy for agency 
problems, we find that only backdating firms experience a reduction in hedging. 
Interestingly, Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012) document that firms with higher CEO 
entrenchment display a higher likelihood of hedging. Taken together, our findings are 
consistent with the interpretation that firms with more agency problems may hedge 
idiosyncratic risk that affects CEO utility without creating value for shareholders.  
According to the monitoring hypothesis, we expect that shareholders of treated 
firms that use financial hedges display higher event-time stock returns compared to 
non-hedgers. We choose the event time to be during the deliberation period of the 
listing requirement changes from February 2002 to November 2003 (similar to 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007). A difference- in-difference approach reveals that 
treated firms with financial hedging prior to the listing rule change outperformed 
treated non-hedger firms, relative to the difference between hedgers and non-hedgers 
of control firms. Depending on the benchmark model and the proxy for hedging, we 
find an outperformance of between 2.5% and 6.4%. 
In sum, we find that the exogenously imposed board independence reduced 
financial hedging but left other corporate hedging policies, such as leverage or firm 
diversification, unaffected. Also, equity volatility, and in particular idiosyncratic risk, 
increased for treated firms. Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that 
agency problems prompted CEOs to hedge risk, especially idiosyncratic risk, in a way 
that benefited themselves at the expense of shareholders. The new board 
independence requirement increased the monitoring role of the board which led to a 
reduction in financial hedging and a relative increase in firm value, providing 
evidence that firms may not hedge optimally, especially if they face more agency 
problems.   
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, our finding that treated 
firms reduce financial hedging and experience an increase in firm value contributes to 
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 Graham and Rodgers (2002) also find that firms where CEOs have a h igher delta o f equity ownership 
hedge more. This is in contrast to Haushalter (2000), who did not find that equity ownership is related 
to hedging in the oil and gas producing industry. 
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the understanding of whether firms hedge optimally. Knopf, Nam, and Thornton 
(2002), Graham and Rogers (2002), and Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012), find that 
CEOs with more option delta in their incentive compensation hedge more. While 
hedging might be valuable as shown in Allayannis and Weston (2001), it is possible 
that firms might over-hedge, thus reducing firm value at the margin. Our paper 
suggests that firms with higher powered CEO incentive contracts and more agency 
problems have hedged too much, potentially to benefit the CEO at the expense of 
shareholders. 
Second, we contribute to the discussion about the role of the board in risk 
management. To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to focus on the role of 
the board in non-financial firms and to conclude that it plays a significant monitoring 
role in risk management. Our study complements research on the link between 
governance and risk management in financial institutions. Schmid, Sabato, and Aebi 
(2011) assess the role of the board in risk management, finding that if the Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) reported directly to the board (as opposed to the CEO), financial 
institutions performed better during the financial crisis. Cunat and Garicano (2010), 
and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2012) show links between board expertise and 
performance of financial institutions during the crises, while Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2012) show that banks which they classify as having a „better risk management‟ 
performed better during the crisis. Our conclusion is also important in light of the 
2010 SEC requirement that firms disclose more information about the role of the 
board in risk management, implying that the role of the board is important even in 
non-financial firms.  
Our study contributes to a third strand that focuses on the determinants of 
financial risk management in companies. The standard corporate finance literature on 
corporate risk management suggests why non-financial firms might want to hedge 
(see footnote 1). However, according to the survey by Bodner et al (2011), these 
theoretical explanations do not match those given by managers about why they 
primarily engage in risk management. Our study adds to this literature by showing 
that agency problems and weak monitoring by the board may lead firms to hedge 
idiosyncratic risk for the benefit of the CEO. Given that we find a reduction in 
financial hedging and a simultaneous increase in idiosyncratic risk among the treated 
firms, this may partially explain why respondents in Bodner et al (2011) did not 
 7 
mention reducing idiosyncratic risk as one of the top three reasons for risk 
management – it may knowingly be suboptimal. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology, Section 3 analyzes whether board independence affects financial 
hedging. In Section 4 we test whether the reduction in hedging is due to adding 
independent directors without financial knowledge or whether the board now 
monitors better. Section 5 tests whether the observed reduction in financial hedging is 
good or bad for shareholders using an event study, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1. Sample selection  
The first part of the paper investigates whether risk management, in particular 
financial hedging, is affected by the exogenously imposed change in board 
independence. Firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ were mandated to have a 
majority of independent directors. The listing rule changes were approved in 
November 2003 by the SEC. The listing requirement changes happened around the 
same time as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was put in place (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2007). To control for the simultaneous changes imposed on all firms, we 
use a difference- in-difference approach first used in Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2009). We start with all publicly listed firms from the Compustat/CRSP database and 
select those that also have information on IRRC about board independence. This 
limits our sample to 1017 firms. We further restrict the sample to non-financial firms 
(excluding firms with SIC 6000-6999). This leaves us with a final sample of 891 
firms and 7271 firm-year observations between 1998 and 2006. Firms are classified as 
treated firms if they did not have a majority independent board in 2002, as defined by 
IRRC.9 The remaining firms are classified as control firms, i.e., firms not explicitly 
affected by the listing rule change mandating majority board independence.   
According to this rule, we classify 202 firms as treated and 689 firms as control firms. 
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 The IRRC definition of independence is stricter than those of the NYSE/Nasdaq.  In an attempt to 
adjust for the discrepancies, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) reclassify former employees as 
independent if three or more years have passed since termination. Guthrie et al (2012) show that 
reclassification  may result in  inconsistent treatment of directors with  or without business relat ionships: 
former employees with business ties to the firm are considered independent, while d irectors with 
business ties who were not formerly employed are not considered independent.   
 8 




To test whether risk management has changed differently between treated and 
control firms, we run the following difference- in-difference regression: 
 
Risk Managementit = β0 + βi afterlawt × treated dummyi + γ'Xit + firmfixed                   (1) 
                                   + FF48 × yearfixed + εit      
 
where i indexes firms and t time. The afterlaw dummy is equal to one from 2003 
onwards. The treated dummy is equal to one in all sample years if the firm is affected 
by the NYSE/NASDQA listing requirement change. Xit represents the independent 
variables included as controls. Firmfixed denotes the firm fixed effect. FF48 are 
dummies for the Fama-French 48 industries. Yearfixed is a year fixed effect. εit is the 
residual. Note that we do not include a treated-dummy separately as it is absorbed in 
the firm fixed effect. Similarly, the afterlaw dummy separately is absorbed in 
industry-year joint fixed effects. Following Guthrie et al (2012) we report 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-period level, where the 
period refers to the years before and after the rule change, respectively.  
 
2.3 Hedging Variable Definitions 
Here we describe the construction of the main variables of interest. Definitions 
of all variables used are given in Table A1, in the Appendix.  
 
2.3.1 Cash Flow Hedging 
Our first proxy for financial hedging is based on reported cash flow hedging. 
Cash flow hedging was introduced with the Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) Statement No. 133 (FAS 133) in 2001. 10  Under FAS 133, a firm records 
changes in the fair value of financial instruments classified as hedging future cash 
flows as a component of equity (accumulated other comprehensive income - AOCI), 
rather than as gain or loss in current earnings. The first proxy sums the absolute 
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 Campbell (2009) uses cash flow hedging to investigate whether the market efficiently incorporates 
this information into equity prices, and finds some evidence of predictability.  
 9 
values of hedge accounting gains and losses per firm-year. Then we standardize this 
variable by lagged book value of assets as a proxy for size.  
The amount of cash flow hedging recorded will vary over time for at least three 
reasons. First, if the firm increases or decreases cash flow hedging. Second, if the 
value of the underlying asset varies. Third, if the hedge contract matures. Thus, in 
order to understand whether treated firms change hedging differently from control 
firms, the treatment effect should identify firms‟ choices to increase or decrease or 
end hedges differently from control firms. To the extent that the variation in the 
underlying affects both treated and control firms in the same industry, the difference-
in-difference approach with industry-year fixed effects should take out the variation in 
hedge accounting due to changes in the value of the underlying. Also, if firms‟ 
average maturity of the hedging contracts is about the same, then realizing gains and 
losses from expirations of contracts should not affect the difference- in-difference 
estimates. However, to the extent that the treatment affects the amount of hedging, the 
difference- in-difference estimate should reveal if there is a change in the quantity of 
cash flow hedging.   
 Nonetheless, there are several drawbacks to using the accounting measure of 
cash flow hedging as a proxy for financial hedging. First, practitioners (e.g., 
Comiskey and Mulford, 2009) suggested that FAS133 guidelines are difficult to 
implement, making classification of financial instruments as qualified hedges under 
the rule a potential restatement risk. However, to affect our inferences from the 
difference- in-difference analysis, treated and control firms would have to 
systematically react differently to the guidelines. This seems unlikely to the extent 
that restatement risks are mainly associated with the correlation between the hedge 
and the underlying risk – something that is common to the industry, for which we 
include controls.  A second drawback of using this proxy of cash flow hedging is that 
„fair value hedges‟ (designed to offset variation in value of balance sheet items) are 
not recorded in AOCI. Thus, cash flow hedging underestimates overall financial 
hedging. A third drawback is that a hedge which is in place but has a va lue of zero 
(i.e., many derivative contracts at the time of entering the hedge) does not affect cash 
flow hedge reporting until the underlying price moves. 
   
2.3.2 Word Count Proxies 
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As an alternative to using hedge accounting as a proxy for financial hedging, we 
create new proxies based on word analysis of the 10-K statements to determine 
whether and how much a firm hedges. We create several variables that count the 
number of times a specific expression appears in a 10-K statement. The first variable, 
called CLMZ, uses the word list of Campello, Lin, Ma, Zou (2011) [derivative, hedg, 
financial instrument, swap, market risk, expos, futures, forward contract, forward 
exchange, option contract, risk management, notional]. Campello et al (2011) and 
Graham and Rodgers (2002) use these words to identify the location of information 
about hedges and collect information on notional values to estimate the extent of 
hedging. Under FAS133, firms do not have to list notional values of the instruments 
anymore. Thus, we simply count the number of risk management related expressions 
as a proxy for the extent of financial hedging assuming a positive correlation between 
risk management and the number of words used to describe it in the 10-Ks. A second 
proxy, called HPS, uses a more extensive list of words (see Appendix) to search the 
10-K statements. These additional search words are retrieved from detailed readings 
of firms that are known to use financial hedging (e.g., Southwest Airlines). One of the 
possible drawbacks of the word search is that certain words might be used as part of 
the description of compensation arrangements. Thus, we report results excluding 
sections 10 (Directors and Officers) and 11 (Executive Compensation) of the 10-K 
from the word count. Interestingly, there is very little difference, as section 11 refers 
to the proxy statement for details on executive compensation plans in 95% of the 10-
Ks we searched. However, even the risk sections of the 10-K can contain references to 
executive compensation. Thus, we create proxies that use more specific words related 
to interest rate (IRHedge) and foreign exchange (FXHedge) risk hedging (see 
Appendix). The advantage of those more specific hedging variables is that IR and FX 
expressions are only used in the context of describing specific exposures and financial 
hedges. As a last proxy we count words that relate to risk management organization 
and functions, such as the title of the risk management officer (RISK_POLICY).  The 
existence and mention of risk management organizations and functions is expected to 
be indicative of a systematic approach to risk management and the prominence that it 
receives as a global process and function rather than an ad hoc or localized function. 
We expect that an increase in the first set of proxies indicates more hedging. 
However, a higher word count on policy related issues could either mean more 
hedging or tighter monitoring of risk management.  
 11 
We create two versions of these proxies: First, we divide the number of words 
related to financial hedging by the number of words in the 10K. Second, we create a 
standardized variable in the following way: (x – min)/(max – min), where x is the 
firm‟s number of words related to hedging in a given year, min is the minimum 
number of words that a firm in the same industry and year has used, and max is the 
maximum number of words a firm in the same industry and year has used. This 
variable thus takes values between zero and one.  
An advantage of the word count proxies is that we can construct them further 
back in time than 2001. A drawback of the word count proxies is that we do not know 
what fraction of the exposure and which exposure firms are hedging. Furthermore, it 
is possible that certain firms describe their hedging activities in much more detail than 
others. Thus, in order for these firm-specific level effects to be controlled for, we run 
firm fixed effects regressions.11 In addition, we control for industry-year fixed effects 
to control for possible changes in the risk at the industry-year level and changes in 
reporting regulation. 
 
2.3.3 Notional value of hedges 
Graham and Rogers (2002) analyze firms‟ hedging activity prior to FAS133 by 
collecting notional value of interest rate and foreign exchange rate hedges. 
Unfortunately, with FAS133 some of that information is not required to be disclosed 
anymore. However, it turns out that about one in three firms still report notional 
values voluntarily. To collect the information, we search each sample firm‟s 10-K in 
the years post 2000 for the notional values of financial hedges. Since firms voluntarily 
report notional values after adoption of FAS133 , we drop firms that do not report 
notional values at least once before 2004. We find that 249 firms out of 891 still 
report notional values. This selection introduces a potentially important sample bias as 
firms are excluded which do not hedge as well as firms that do hedge but do not 
report notional values anymore. Our primary purpose of collecting this information is 
to try helping us understand whether our word count measures correlate with notional 
value hedge measures – conditional on firms hedging. This will allow us to estimate 
                                                 
11
 Note that if the exogenous change to the board independence also affects the quantity of reporting in 
general, then one might worry that a change in our hedging proxies might only be due to changes in 
reporting rather than real changes in hedging. However, to the extent that the board changes affect the 
general quantity of information revealed (higher or lower), our proxies adjust for this by dividing 
hedging word counts by the total word count of the 10-K form. 
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whether variation in word count measures are due to more or less hedging or whether 
firms simply discuss their exposure to risk and explain why they are not hedging. 
Second, we can estimate whether treated firms that do hedge actually change their 
notional values – thus eliminating the concern that the newly majority independent 
boards simply change the reporting on financial hedging. 
 We follow Graham and Rogers (2002) approach in collecting notional values of 
interest rate and exchange rate hedges and add notional values of commodity hedges. 
Hedges are classified as long positions if the hedge leads firms to gain from an 
increase in interest rate, exchange rate, or commodity prices. We then compute the net 
hedging position by risk (interest rate, exchange rate, commodity). The total hedging 
is then the sum of the absolute value of the ratio of notional hedges to book value of 
assets.   
  
2.3.3 Univariate Statistics 
Table 1, panel A lists the univariate statistics of the hedging proxies as averages 
across the sample period. All results reported are based on winsorizing variables at the 
one and 99th percentile. In our sample of firms, on average, hedging related words 
using the CLMZ (HPS) word list account for 0.18% (0.27%) of all the words in the 
10-K statements. The 25th and 75th percentiles are 0.07% and 0.26% (0.12% and 
0.39%). The IRHedge and FXHedge variables have a mean of 0.009% and 0.004% 
respectively. More importantly, the correlation between IRHedge (FXHedge) and 
HPS are 0.36 and 0.52, respectively, indicating that a significant fraction of the 
variation in HPS is due to variation in financial hedging rather than other types of 
descriptions in the 10-K (e.g., compensation programs, leases). We further test the 
quality of the word count measure by computing time-series correlations between 
HPS and net notional value of hedges of firms that still reported them in the 10-K up 
until at least 2004. We find that the average net notional- to-asset ratio is 4.9% and if 
we condition on firm engaging in hedging, the average net notional-to-asset ratio is 
7.9%. Graham and Rogers (2002) and Campello et al (2011) report net-notional- to-
asset ratios of about 9% for their sample firms in 1994/95 and 1996-2002, 
respectively. We then compute a time series correlation between HPS and the net -to-
asset ratio for each firm with available data. The median correlation between the net 
notional-to-asset ratio and CLMZ (HPS, IRHedge ,FXHedge) are 54% (54%, 67%, 
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42%).   The significantly positive correlations lend further credibility to the word 
count measures as proxies for the extent of risk management.   
The average standardized CLMZ and HPS measures are 0.16 and 0.18 
respectively. If the hedging word use was uniformly distributed between min and max 
within an industry-year, the average would be 0.5. These averages indicate that there 
are some firms in each industry with a very high count of risk management related 
words. However, we did check that the averages were not driven by a handful of 
outliers. When winsorizing the variables at the third and 97th percentile, the average 
standardized measures increase only marginally to 0.17 and 0.19 respectively, 
indicating that there is a wide dispersion in the use of hedging within an industry.12   
The number of words related to the risk management organization and functions 
is relatively small, representing only 0.007% of the total words in the 10-K. 42% of 
the firm-year observations show some description of risk management policy. 
Interestingly, Bodner et al (2011) report that 44% of non-financial firms said they had 
a risk management policy in place. 
The absolute value of cash flow hedges divided by the lagged book value of 
assets is 0.15%, while the median is zero.  We focus on absolute values as a proxy to 
capture the extent of hedging rather than the direction of hedging or the net positions. 
A back of the envelop calculation shows that firms which use cash flow hedging 
hedge about 19% of their average profits.13 However, we find that only 16% of the 
sample firm-years use cash flow hedging (D(CFHedge)). Compared to the 42% of the 
firms that report some risk management policy in our sample and Bodner et al‟s 
(2011) survey evidence of 44% of firms with risk management policies, it seems 
likely that the hedge accounting proxy underestimates the extent of financial risk 
management. In order to assess whether the cash flow hedge proxy is systematically 
biased based upon the industry, we report in panel B of Table 1 the averages for each 
of the 10 Fama-French industries.14 According to the hedge accounting proxy, we find 
that Energy and Utilities (Shops and HiTech) industries are the two highest (lowest) 
users of financial hedging, on average. We obtain a similar ranking if we use the word 
                                                 
12
 We have also run all the regressions winsorizing the hedging variables at the three and 97
th
 
percentiles. None of the inferences are affected (not tabulated). 
13
 On average, firms  have an ROA of 5% and hedge 0.09% of assets. Thus, the average firm hedges 
3.0% of its profits (0.15%/5% ROA). Among the 16% of the firms which report cash flow hedging, the 
average profit hedged is therefore about 18.75% (3.0%/16%). 
14
 Note that we use the Fama-French 48 industry classification in the regressions. However, for 
expositional purposes we report here the condensed industry classification. 
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count measures CLMZ and HPS expressed as a fraction of the total number of words 
in the 10-K statements. The two top industries are Energy and Utility, the two bottom 
industries are Telecom and Healthcare (followed very closely by Shops and HiTech).   
While there is significant variation between industries in terms of the average 
hedging, the ranking is very similar across the different proxies. This reduces our 
concern that the cash flow hedging proxy is systematically biased against one 
particular industry.   
Panel C of Table 1 shows univariate statistics for control variables that we 
include in the regressions. We control for the industry concentration since Giroud and 
Mueller (2010, 2011) show that governance changes in competitive industries have 
less of an impact. Firm size could affect access to hedging instruments. We use the 
log of the book value of assets as a proxy for size. Firm age could correlate with 
hedging for a number of reasons. First, older firms would have had more time to do 
operating hedges and might thus need fewer financial hedges. Older firms could also 
hedge less if they are more complacent. We add Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. Growth firms might have to trade off between investing in new projects 
or hedging if there are financial constraints (e.g., Rampini and Vishwanathan, 2010). 
Hedging could be affected by the performance of the firm (Rampini, Sufi, 
Vishwanathan, 2012). We include ROA, lagged ROA, and the stock return over the 
calendar year as controls.  
 
3. Board independence and financial hedging 
We address the question of whether firms hedge optimally in a difference- in-
difference framework where we study the changes in risk management around the 
2003 NYSE/NASDAQ listing rule change, which required firms that did not yet have 
a majority independent board to change its board composition.  
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
In the following section, we describe what changes we expect when the board 
becomes independent. Our null hypothesis is that the board does not affect financial 
hedging. Alternatively, if the board matters, the amount of financial risk management 
could either go up or down at the time when the board has to become majority 
independent. 
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Under the assumption that the newly majority independent board acts in the 
interest of shareholders we have the following hypotheses: 
H1: Risk management increases if the insider dominated board has done too 
little hedging. This increase is in the interest of shareholders. 
H2: Risk management decreases if the insider dominated board has done too 
much hedging. This decrease is in the interest of shareholders. 
  
It is also possible that the newly majority independent board does not have the 
necessary knowledge to hedge the company‟s exposure in an optimal way.  
 
H3: Risk management increases, leading to over-hedging. This change would be 
suboptimal for shareholders. 
H4: Risk management decreases, leading to under-hedging. This change would 
be suboptimal for shareholders. 
 
3.2 Difference- in-difference estimates 
3.2.1. Main results 
Table 2 shows estimates of regression (1) with the various hedging proxies. In 
column 1, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the hedge accounting losses 
and gains recorded at the fiscal year end, standardized by lagged book value of assets. 
The main variable of interest is the afterlaw * treated dummy interaction. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is -0.031, significant at the 10% level.  This 
coefficient implies that treated firms reduce the amount of unrealized gains and losses 
due to hedging by 21% (-0.031/0.145) relative to the overall sample average. We find 
that larger firms (measured by log of assets) use more cash flow hedging, as do firms 
with a higher Tobin‟s Q, higher ROA, and a higher stock return. Older firms use less 
cash flow hedging. 
 In column 2 we use the word count measure CLMZ expressed as a fraction of 
the total number of words in the 10-K statements, and find a coefficient of -0.017, 
significant at the 1% level. To assess the economic impact, compare the coefficient of 
-0.017 to the unconditional average of 0.18 percent. Thus, the treatment effect reduces 
the fraction of words related to hedging by 9.4% (-0.017/0.18). A similar inference 
follows in column 3, where we use the word count measure HPS. The coefficient 
there is -0.027, significant at the 1% level. The unconditional average HPS is 0.27. 
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The coefficient thus implies a reduction of hedging words by 10% (-0.027/0.27). 
Standardizing the variables by the difference between the maximum and minimum 
number of words related to hedging in a given industry-year, we find in columns 4 
and 5 that treated firms display a statistically significant reduction in financial 
hedging use of 0.022 and 0.024 respectively. Thus, within the industry, treated firms 
reduce the number of words related to financial hedging by 13.7% (-0.022/0.161) and 
13.5% (-0.024/0.178) respectively, relative to control firms in the same industry.   
In columns 6 and 7 we report regressions where the hedging measure is based 
on a count of words related to either interest rate hedging or foreign exchange 
hedging. We show the standardized form of the two hedging variables and find in 
both cases significantly negative coefficients, indicating that treated firms reduce the 
use of interest rate and foreign exchange related hedging tools. Economically, the 
coefficients imply a reduction of 36.4% (-0.036/0.099) for interest rate hedging, and 
25.3% (-0.022/0.087) for exchange rate hedging.  
One concern with the continuous hedging variable specification is that potential 
outliers affect the estimates. In column 8 we report marginal effects of a logit 
industry-year fixed effect regression, where the dependent variable is equal to one if 
the firm uses an above industry-year-median number of words for the HPS measure 
related to financial hedging. The coefficient on the interaction term is again 
significantly negative with -0.239, indicating that treated firms reduce financial 
hedging around the event.  Similar inferences can be drawn from discretizing the 
other hedging variables (not shown).   
In column 9 we show that even using the net notional-to-asset ratio as a proxy 
for the extent of risk management, we find a marginally significant drop among 
treated firms. The coefficient of -0.014 implies that treated firms reduce their net 
notional values of hedging by 1.4% of the assets relative to control firms. Given the 
overall mean net notional-to-asset ratio of 4.9%, this is economically a sizable 
reduction. Note, however, that this inference applies only to firms which hedge. 
Nonetheless, it is reassuring to see that measures used in earlier studies to proxy for 
hedging lead to similar inferences, namely, that treated firms reduce their financial 
hedging relative to control firms.  
All regressions so far are consistent with the interpretation that financial hedging 
is reduced in firms that were forced to get a majority independent board relative to the 
control firms. However, in column 10 where we use RISK_POLICY as the dependent 
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variable, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the afterlaw * treated 
dummy interaction. Thus, while hedge accounting, the use of words related to 
financial hedging, and net notional-to-asset hedging decrease, the discussion of risk 
management policy and functions related issues has increased in treated firms.   
 
3.2.2 Robustness 
Inferences from the difference- in-difference methodology rely on the 
assumption that, absent the treatment effect, both treated and control firms would 
have changed the same. To assess whether this is plausible, we test whether treated 
and control firms followed a parallel trend prior to the treatment. We test for 
differences in hedging measures between treatment and control firms by running the 
difference- in-difference regression 1 where we replace the afterlaw dummy with year 
dummies. The holdout year, t, is 2002. We find that none of the pre-event variables 
are significant, as shown in Table 3, panel A. This analysis suggests that the parallel 
trend assumption is not violated for any of the three main hedging proxies. 
Furthermore, differences in hedging start to be significantly different from 2004 
onwards for all proxies, and for some proxies from 2003 onwards. 
We also test whether the firm characteristics we include as control variables 
evolve significantly differently. However, we find no significantly different trends in 
firm size, measured as the log of assets, Tobin‟s Q, ROA and ROA lagged, 
contemporaneous stock returns over one year, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 
industry concentration computed at the three-digit SIC level, and firm age (not 
reported). Nonetheless, to test whether the inclusion of these firm level controls are 
„bad controls‟ (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) which potentially bias the treatment 
coefficient dummy, we exclude all control variables, except for the fixed effects.  
Table 3, panel B shows that the coefficients and t-statistics on the afterlaw * 
treatment dummies are basically unaffected.  
 
3.2.3. Inferences 
Based on our hypotheses, there are two possible reasons to observe a drop in 
financial hedging and an increase in the discussion about risk management policy: 
First, agency problems have led to too much financial hedging. The new board might 
monitor more and cut back on hedging (H2). Second, the new board could have cut 
back on ex-ante valuable hedging because it does not have the knowledge (H4), and 
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would discuss the changes in the risk management policy in the 10-K.  However, both 
hypotheses are formulated holding the level of risk incurred by the company constant. 
Since our hedging measures are not able to control for risk exposure, it is possible that 
treated firms simply reduce the underlying risks, which in turn reduces the need to use 
financial hedges. Thus, the identified treatment effect could be spurious. In order to 
address this issue, we test whether the corporate policies were adjusted in a way that 
reduces risk and whether equity risk has changed. 
 
3.3. Board independence and changes in risks 
One reason why we could find a change in financial hedging for treated versus 
control firms is that the treatment affects the amount of risks taken – and accordingly 
affects financial risk management. Thus, the question we are asking here is one of 
causality. Is it that financial hedging is reduced, which increases risk born by 
investors, or is it that business risk and financial risk are reduced, which requires less 
financial hedging and reduces risk born by investors? 
If the reason for the observed reduction in financial hedging is that treated firms 
reduce business and/or financial risks, then we predict firms‟ corporate policies to 
change in the following directions: 1) Diversification should increase; 2) cash holding 
should increase; 3) leverage should decrease; 4) investment, especially in more risky 
R&D, should decrease. To the extent that other policies could be changed (e.g., 
operating leverage, geographic diversification, etc.), the inferences from our tests are 
limited by the policies investigated. 
We use the same methodology (equation 1) to test whether the board 
independence requirement has affected corporate policies. Variables are defined in the 
Appendix, univariate statistics given in Table 1, panel D, and the regression results 
reported in Table 4. We first test whether the number of segments in different two-
digit SIC industries changes, and whether the probability of being diversified (defined 
as having multiple segments in different two-digit SICs) has changed. Both 
regressions show insignificant coefficients on the afterlaw * treated dummy. 
Furthermore, we find no significant treatment effect in cash, leverage, capex, and 
R&D.15   Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the exogenous change in 
                                                 
15
 Bodnar et  al (2011) find in  their survey that the majority of respondents did not do risk management 
in order to protect future investments, nor was cash holding a substitute for risk management. 
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board independence does not systematically affect corporate policies which would 
reduce the level of business and financial risk taken by treated firms. This finding is 
consistent with the interpretation that the documented reduction in financial hedging 
is unlikely driven by a lower need for hedging since business risk and financial risk 
are not reduced by the treatment.  
 
3.4. Board Independence and Equity Risk Changes 
Guay (1999) finds that firms which start using financial hedging reduce their 
equity risk, and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2011) show in a cross-country study 
that firms which use more financial hedging display lower equity volatility, both in 
the systematic as well as idiosyncratic volatility parts. Based on those prior findings, 
we expect that a reduction in hedging should lead to an increase in equity volatility.   
Alternatively, if the reduction in hedging was because treated firms reduce their 
business and/or financial risks, then we would expect treated firms to display a 
reduction in equity volatility. 
 
3.4.1 Methodology and variable definition 
 
We ask whether equity volatility has changed differently for treated and control 
firms. In these tests we use proxies for equity volatility at the annual frequency as our 
dependent variables. We use the following procedures to estimate equity volatility. 
First we use a time series of daily stock returns over a calendar year to estimate an 
annual equity volatility. To separate volatility into a systematic and an idiosyncratic 
risk component, we report results using a one-factor market model. As a robustness 
test we also report the idiosyncratic volatility estimates from a four-factor model.  Our 
estimates for the systematic risk component are based on estimating beta using daily 
returns over the preceding year. We then compute the annual systematic volatility part 
as beta-squared times the market return variance of the year based on daily market 
returns.  The idiosyncratic volatility is the variance of the (market) mode l‟s residuals. 
All dependent variables are in log-form so that the coefficient on the afterlaw * 
treated dummy can be interpreted as the percentage change in the volatility.  
                                                                                                                                            
However, among those respondents where risk management and cash holding was correlated, the 
majority said there was a positive association.    
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In equation (1) we additionally include lagged volatility to account for ARCH 
and GARCH type behaviors (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). In this analysis, the 
contemporaneous log stock return is included to control for predictable volatility 
changes due to recent stock return trends (e.g., Brandt and Kang, 2004). Since the 
amount of firm specific information available to the market can affect the level of risk 
(e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) we also control for the amount of information 
released by the board in the 10-K forms. To do this we include the log of the total 
number of words in the 10-K statement. Furthermore, prior research has shown that 
volatility changes differently after good versus bad news. Thus, we include a proxy 
for the tone of the information in the 10-K statement. We use the dictionary created 
by Loughran and Macdonald (2011) to determine whether a word is good news, bad 
news, or no news.  
 
3.4.2 Does equity volatility change? 
Table 5 shows the difference- in-difference regression results. In the first column 
we find that total risk increases significantly for treated firms relative to control firms. 
The coefficient on afterlaw * treated dummy is 0.049, significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that total annualized equity volatility increased by 4.9% for treated firms 
relative to control firms. The regression also shows that firms with higher leverage 
display higher equity volatility. Under the assumption of constant firm risk, an 
increase in leverage is predicted to increase equity risk.  Firms with higher ROA, 
higher lagged ROA, and higher stock returns display a lower volatility consistent with 
the previously documented negative correlation between returns and volatility (e.g., 
Brandt and Kang, 2004). The positive and significant coefficient on lagged volatility 
is consistent with an ARCH type process.  Firms which increase the information in 
the 10-K display an increase in volatility, while those which use more positive words 
in their 10-K have a lower volatility. Finally, larger and older firms display a lower 
volatility.   
In column 2 (3) we report the systematic (idiosyncratic) volatility regression 
using the value-weighted CRSP index as the market return. We find that treated firms 
do not significantly change the systematic risk component compared to the control 
firms from before to after the listing rule change. However, idiosyncratic volatility for 
treated firms increases significantly as reported in column 3. The same inferences can 
be drawn from using the equally-weighted CRSP index as the market return, as shown 
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in columns 4 and 5. Column 6 reports a regression using the idiosyncratic volatility 
from a four factor model. Consistent with the one factor model, we find that 
idiosyncratic risk has increased significantly for treated firms. 
To the extent that diversified shareholders do not benefit from a reduction in 
idiosyncratic risk (at least as much as the undiversified CEO does), the findings are 
consistent with the monitoring role of the newly independent board in their risk 
management function.  However, hedging idiosyncratic risk could theoretically be in 
the interest of shareholders as long as frictions such as bankruptcy costs and 
asymmetric information costs are sufficiently high.  Thus, in the following section we 
test whether the reduction in financial hedging is driven by better monitoring (H2) or 
by a possible lack of knowledge by the newly independent board (H4). 
 
4. Agency Problems versus Lack of Knowledge 
In order to distinguish between H2 and H4, we test first whether financial 
expertise, as a proxy for knowledge, affects hedging activity as predicted by H4. To 
test H2, we ask whether firms with more agency problems prior to the exogenous 
shock experience a bigger drop in hedging.  Then we will investigate the shareholder 
wealth changes around the introduction of the rule change. 
  
4.1 Financial expertise 
The forth hypothesis assumes that the newly independent board might lack 
knowledge to hedge in a value maximizing way. We investigate whether adding 
financial experts to the board affects financial hedging. 
4.1.1 Methodology 
Here we test whether financial experts on the board affect financial hedging. 
The problem with such a test is that firms choose director characteristics 
endogenously. To alleviate this endogeneity issue we use a new requirement imposed 
by SOX on firms‟ boards, namely that the accounting committee of the board needs to 
have a financial expert as a member of the (fully independent) committee. We classify 
firms as treated firms if they did not have a financial expert according to the definition 
of SOX among their independent board members in 200216. The other firms are used 
as control firms. Eighty firms are classified as treated, 811 firms as control firms.  We 
                                                 
16
 We follow the methodology of Kim et al (2012) in  implementing the SEC‟s defin ition of financial 
expert. 
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use the same regression (1) but add the  afterlaw * financial expert treatment dummy 
which is equal to one for the period after 2003 if the firm did not have a financial 
expert on the audit committee in 2002.  
4.1.2 Results 
Results are shown in Table 6. Across all the specifications shown, we find no 
significant changes in financial hedging for treated firms which had to add a financial 
expert as an independent board member. However, the board independence treatment 
remains significant in all specifications. Interestingly, the correlation between the two 
treatment effects is only about 9% suggesting that the two effects are different. Thus, 
even if we only include the financial expert treatment dummy, we find no significant 
treatment effect using all different hedging variables (not tabulated). In column 8 we 
report an industry-year fixed effect logit regression where the dependent variable is 
equal to one if the firm-year had an above sample HPS measure.  Since we have no 
firm fixed effect, we add a dummy equal to one in all sample years if the firm was 
treated (financial expert treatment dummy). Interestingly, the negative coefficient on 
the financial expert treatment dummy indicates that treated firms which were required 
to add a financial expert, have used less financial hedging throughout the sample 
period. However, we find no significant coefficient on the afterlaw * financial expert 
treatment dummy suggesting that imposing a financial expert on the audit committee 
of the board has not significantly altered those firms‟ extent of financial hedging. 
To the extent that H4 predicts a significant change in financial hedging due to 
director knowledge, the above analysis suggests that knowledge is not the primary 
driver of the observed drop in financial hedging by firms required to get a majority 
independent board. However, it does not exclude that adding new independent 
directors, endogenously chosen to be „without‟ financial expertise, causes a cut in 
valuable hedging activity due to a lack of knowledge. To sharpen the test, we create a 
triple interaction term between the afterlaw * treated dummy and the financial expert 
treatment dummy. The fraction of firms falling into this category is relatively small 
with only 4% of the firms that do not comply with both requirements.  The hypothesis 
is that if independent directors, which need to be added, lack the knowledge and thus 
cut back on hedging, then the afterlaw * treated dummy should have a negative 
coefficient while the triple interaction with the financial expert treatment should be 
positive and significant. Finding that the coefficient on the triple interaction is 
insignificant or even negative would be consistent with the interpretation that the lack 
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of knowledge of independent directors is unlikely to explain the reason for cutting 
financial hedging. 
In Table 7 we find that all triple interaction terms are insignificant, some with a 
negative coefficient and some with a positive coefficient while the coefficients on the 
afterlaw * treated dummy are still negative and at least marginally significant.  Note 
that the few observations we have in each of the interaction variables weakens this 
test.  Nonetheless, the findings are consistent with the interpretation that the lack of 
knowledge of newly appointed board members is rather unlikely to explain why firms 
did cut their financial hedging.  
The finding that adding a financial expert is not related to a change in financial 
risk management is somewhat unexpected given the findings in Cunat and Garicano 
(2010) as well as Minton et al (2012). While the former finds that Spanish banks 
having board members with financial expertise are performing better during the recent 
financial crisis thanks to better loans performance, Minton et al (2012) find that US 
financial institutions perform worse during the crisis if they had more financial 
experts on the board. Our analysis, using an exogenous shock to the financial 
expertise of the board of non-financial firms, suggests no significant impact of adding 
a financial expert on changes in financial hedging. However, we do find in columns 8 
of Tables 5 and 6 that without firm fixed effects there is evidence of a significant 
difference in the average level of hedging (over the entire sample period) between 
firms that did not have a financial expert on the audit committee in 2002 and those 
that did. This suggests that board expertise and the level of hedging might be 
simultaneously determined. Such reverse causality issues might explain some of the 
differences in the conclusions between Cunat and Garicano (2010) and Minton et al 
(2012). 
 
4.2 Agency problems 
Hypothesis 2 assumes that the reduction in hedging is due to the monitoring by 
the newly majority independent board. Such a board would cut back on excessive 
hedging by management. We expect that cutbacks in financial hedging due to 
monitoring by the board are more likely in firms with higher agency problems.  
 
4.2.1 CEO ownership levels 
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CEOs with high equity ownership in the firm are more exposed to idiosyncratic 
risk which affects their utility but not the utility of a diversified shareholder. Knopf, 
Nam, Thornton (2002) find that high CEO equity ownership is associated with more 
hedging. Similarly, Graham and Rogers (2002) find CEOs with a higher delta of 
ownership hedge more using financial derivatives. We split the sample into high 
versus low CEO equity ownership based on the CEOs stock ownership in his/her 
company in 2002 relative to the median CEO stock ownership in our sample. We use 
equation (1) and interact the afterlaw * treated dummy with a high and a low equity 
ownership dummy. Note again that the high and low equity ownership dummies are 
not included separately in the regression since they are subsumed in the firm fixed 
effect.  In Table 8 we show regressions using the different hedging variables. We find 
the reduction in financial hedging to be concentrated among high CEO equity 
ownership firms, consistent with the interpretation that agency costs have led firms to 
hedge too much and the new, majority independent board is monitoring risk 
management. An F-test asking whether the two interaction coefficients are different 
from each other is significant in five out of the nine specifications.  
A potential concern with our conclusion is based on Klein‟s (2002) finding that 
higher CEO ownership is weakly associated with higher earnings management. If 
such managers used hedge accounting and financial derivatives to manage earnings, 
our findings might indicate that an independent board cuts back on earning 
management rather than reducing risk management. However, such an interpretation 
is inconsistent with Klein (2002) and Chen, Cheng, and Wang (2011) that find no 
association between board independence and earnings management. In untabulated 
tests we replace the proxies for risk management with proxies for earnings 
management developed by Stubbern (2010), Jones (1991) and Kotharie et at (2005) 
and find no significant coefficients on either the afterlaw * treated dummy nor on the 
afterlaw * treated dummy * high (low) CEO ownership dummy.  
 
4.2.2 Lucky Option Grants 
Another way to separate firms into higher versus lower entrenchment is to split 
the sample by firms which have granted backdated options to board members. Firms 
are considered to have given board members backdated option using the lucky grant 
definition of Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010). A lucky option grant to an 
independent board member is an option grant awarded on the day with the lowest 
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stock price of the calendar month. Bebchuk et al (2010) show that even grants to 
independent directors display an abnormally high frequency on the lowest stock price 
day of the month. We interact the afterlaw * treated dummy with a backdating 
dummy and a no-backdating dummy.  The backdating dummy is equal to one if a firm 
has given a lucky grant to independent directors in any of the years between 1998 and 
2002, and zero otherwise. In Table 9 we show the coefficients of these regressions.  
We find that reductions in financial hedging are more likely among firms where 
directors did get backdated (lucky) options. Note, however, that the coefficients on 
the interaction variable afterlaw * treated dummy * backdate are statistically 
insignificant in columns 6 (IR Hedge variable) and 8 (no firm fixed effects). Again, 
three of the nine F-tests between the two coefficients are showing statistical 
significance.  
The tests are consistent with H2 in that the newly independent board cuts back 
on financial hedging activities where more agency problems existed. These findings 
contribute to Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012) who find that firms with higher CEO 
entrenchment display a higher likelihood of hedging.   
 
4.2.3 Hedging need 
Industries vary in their use of financial hedging. As we have shown in Table 1 
the fraction of firms per Fama-French 10 industry classification that reports hedge 
accounting as of 2002 is between 4% and 26%. According to H2, we expect firms to 
have hedged too much due to agency problems which the board did tolerate. The 
newly majority independent board, however, seems to cut back on such excessive 
hedging according to the tests above.  If agency problems are the root cause for 
previous excessive hedging, we expect under H2 that firms in industries with a lower 
hedging propensity would see their hedging reduced more. The model we have in 
mind is one where the utility of the manager increases with a decrease in idiosyncratic 
risk. Industries where hedging is done extensively anyways because it is good for 
shareholder value will likely see less excessive hedging compared to industries where 
hedging is uncommon and likely not in the interest of shareholders.  Note that H4, the 
knowledge hypothesis, predicts either no difference between high and low hedging 
need industries or larger cuts in the high hedging need industries assuming that in 
high hedging need industries financial knowledge is more important to manage risk. 
Table 10 shows regressions where we interact afterlaw * treated dummy with a high 
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hedging need industry dummy and a low hedging need industry dummy. High 
hedging need industries are those where the fraction of firms hedging is above the 
median in 2002. Hedging industries are defined using the ten Fama-French industries 
classification, while the regression includes industry-year fixed effects where the 
industries are defined using the 48 Fama-French industries classification. 
We find that the reduction in financial hedging is concentrated among low 
hedging need industries. The drop is more significant in low hedging need industries 
because the level of hedging is, per construction, lower to start with. In the first 
column where the dependent variable is CFHedge, we find a coefficient of -0.036 for 
the low hedging need industries. This coefficient implies a reduction in hedging of 
30% (-0.036/0.12). The coefficient on the high hedging industry interaction is an 
insignificant -0.020. Furthermore, in high hedging need industries, the average 
absolute value of cash flow hedging is 0.18% implying a reduction of only 11% (-
0.02/0.18). The coefficients in the third column where the dependent variable is HPS 
are -0.029 (low need) and -0.025 (high need). This implies a reduction in hedging by 
12% (-0.029/0.24) in low hedging need industries, and 8% (-0.025/0.32) in high 
hedging need industries. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that the 
board now monitors better and cuts excessive hedging especially where the need for 
hedging seems lower. Further support comes from the risk policy variable in Tables 8-
10 where we find that the word count related to risk policy increases marginally 
significantly in the subsamples classified as having higher agency problems while the 
change is not significant in the other subsamples.   
 
5 Event study 
The evidence thus far is consistent with the interpretation that treated firms 
reduce financial hedging, especially if there are agency problems. Implicitly this 
suggests that shareholders are made better off by the governance change. However, 
we lack more direct evidence of the impact of the changes in hedging on shareholder 
value. Thus, to differentiate further between the two hypotheses, we study the impact 
of the treatment on shareholder value conditional on a firm‟s financial hedging. 
Cutting back on hedging when hedging was excessive due to agency problems 
predicts that equity value should increase. Cutting back on optimal hedging programs 
due to a lack of knowledge would predict a loss in shareholder value. 
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We test the impact of hedging on shareholder value fo llowing the methodology 
of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007). They measure shareholder returns over the 
period from November 2001 to October 200217, the period of SOX deliberation. We 
use a slightly different time window to better match the listing rule changes time 
period (for a time line, see Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007).  The SEC first asked 
the NYSE and NASDAQ to design new listing rules on 2/13/2002. NASDAQ 
submitted its second round proposal for approval by the SEC on 10/9/2002. The SEC 
did finally approve both exchanges‟ listing rule changes on 11/3/2003. We show 
event study tests using the window: February, 1, 2002 – November, 4, 2003. We use 
this period to ask whether treated firms with financial hedging in 2002 outperform 
treated firms without hedging in 200218. In order to control for simultaneous effects 
that affect all hedging versus non-hedging firms, we subtract from this difference the 
difference between control firms with hedging in 2002 and control firms without 
hedging in 2002. We classify firms as hedgers if the ratio of CLMZ (HPS) words to 
total words in the 10-K is above the sample median in 2002, or alternatively if the 
firm reports cash flow hedges. The remaining firms are classified as non-hedgers.19 
Since we only have one event window, we follow Schwert (1981), Campbell, 
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006), and 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), in addressing the problem of clustering by 
grouping firms into portfolios. 
In a first test, we compute the difference in the following portfolio (PF) returns  
each day: 
Abnormal return =        (PF[treated firm, hedging] – PF[treated firm, non-hedging]) (2) 
– (PF[control firm, hedging] – PF[control firm, non-hedging]). 
 
This mirrors the difference- in-difference methodology. We report the average 
daily abnormal difference- in-difference abnormal returns in Table 11, panel A. The 
standard errors and t-statistics are based on the time series variation of daily abnormal 
                                                 
17
 Enron filed earn ings restatements in November 2001 (bankruptcy 12/2/01). In October 2002, 
NASDAQ submitted its rule changes to the SEC. The period includes the signing of SOX (8/2002). 
18
 Inferences are unaffected whether we define hedgers based on fiscal year end 2001 or 2002 (not 
tabulated).  
19
 We do not show results where we split  the sample using net notional-to-asset as a proxy fo r hedging 
because that sample of firms does not contain non-hedgers, by construction.  However, splitting the 
sample among those hedgers, we find that treated firms  with more hedging experience a higher 
abnormal return, but the return differences are generally insignificant with p -values around 0.2.  
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returns.  For each of the four portfolios used in the difference-in-difference estimate, 
we estimate the abnormal return for each stock, each day as  
ARi,t = Ri,t – E(Ri,t),         (3) 
where E(Ri,t) is based on either the market model, the Fama-French three factor 
model, or a Fama-French-Carhart four factor model. The parameters of the factor 
models are estimated using 252 days outside the event window and are held constant 
during the event window.  
Alternatively, we compute the abnormal return based on raw portfolio returns 
according to equation 2. We weigh each observation by the inverse of the number of 
stocks in the respective portfolio. This assures that the alpha of the long-short 
portfolio is not affected by the risk-free rate. The intercept of these regressions 
provide an estimate of the average daily abnormal return and its significance. We 
report one, three, and four factor model results.  
In panel A of Table 11, the difference-in-difference average daily abnormal 
returns are all positive and most are statistically significant. We also report the event 
window cumulative abnormal return by multiplying the average daily abnormal return 
by 444. Using the market model, we find treated hedgers outperform cumulatively by 
5.8% (CLMZ), 6.4% (HPS), and 3.5% (CFHedge), compared to treated non-hedgers 
and the difference between hedgers and non-hedgers of the control firms.20 The p-
value of the daily abnormal returns are 0.01, 0.00, and 0.09, respectively. 
Cumulative abnormal return estimates using the three- or four factor models are 
similar. However, the three- and four-factor model abnormal returns for the CFHedge 
proxy are not statistically significant anymore. 
In panel B of Table 11 we show the results of the one, three- and four-factor 
regression results. Using the market model, the estimated cumulative abnormal 
returns over the event period are 5.1% (CLMZ), 4.9% (HPS), 3.8% (CFHedge), 
significant at the 5%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Again, using three- or four-
factor models, we find similar results, with only the abnormal returns in the three- and  
four-factor models being insignificant when using the CFHedge proxy. 
We interpret these positive and statistically mostly significant abnormal stock 
returns as being inconsistent with H4. Thus, it is unlikely that the reduction in hedging 
                                                 
20
 Note that these CAR estimates are not due to the board independence treatment, they are the 
additional return treated hedging firms get over non-hedgers. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find 
that the board independence treatment adds to shareholder value between 4% and 14% depending on 
the factor model used. 
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is predominantly due to a lack of knowledge as such a reduction in hedging would 
have to be value reducing as well.  
It is interesting to compare the economic magnitudes of our abnormal returns 
(between 2.5% and 6.4%) to the average value premium of currency hedgers 
estimated by Allayannis and Weston (2001) of 5%. Our findings suggest that the 5% 
hedging value premium might be a downward biased estimate because some hedging 
firms are not optimally hedging dragging down the average.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We provide some of the first evidence that suggests that firms do not hedge 
optimally. Agency problems led treated firms to hedge too much, and the newly 
independent board, through better monitoring, reduced financial hedging, which in 
turn increased shareholder value.  
Our findings add to Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002), Graham and Rogers 
(2002), and Kumar and Rabinovitch (2012) by suggesting that the higher level of 
hedging in firms with high CEO equity exposure was potentially value reducing. 
Furthermore, the inferences from our analyses support the notion behind the SEC‟s 
2010 reporting requirement change about the role of the board in risk management. 
We find that board governance does significantly affect financial risk management in 
our setting by better monitoring and cutting back on hedges that reduce idiosyncratic 
risk to the benefit of CEOs, but at the expense of shareholders.   
In addition, our finding that idiosyncratic volatility increases as a consequence 
of the listing rule changes mandating majority independent boards adds to our 
understanding of the determinants of volatility. Schwert (1989) shows that risk varies 
through time and cannot only be explained by macroeconomic shocks. Bartram, 
Brown and Stulz (2012) list five reasons why volatility is higher in the US than in 
other countries. Among the reasons is the quality of corporate governance (e.g., 
Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Our paper adds to this literature by using an exogenous 
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Appendix 1 Variable Definitions 
 
VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
CF HEDGE/AT  
Absolute value of unrealized gain or loss from cash flow hedging (Variable: aocidergl) scaled by lagged 
total asset (item #6). 
CLMZ HEDGE 
Number of words from the CLMZ (Campello et al., 2011) word list  (defined in Appendix 2) divided by 
the total number of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 
(executive compensation) of the 10-K.  
HPS HEDGE 
Number of words from the HPS word list  (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number of words in 
the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive compensation) of the 
10-K. 
RISK POLICY 
Number of words from the Risk policy word list  (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number of 
words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive 
compensation) of the 10-K. 
FX HEDGE 
Number of words from the foreign exchange (FX) word list  (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total 
number of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive 
compensation) of the 10-K. 
IR HEDGE 
Number of words from the interest rate (IR) word list  (defined in Appendix 2) divided by the total number 
of words in the 10-K. Excludes words from sections 10 (directors and officers) and 11 (executive 
compensation) of the 10-K. 
CLMZ HEDGE 
STD 
Number of words from the CLMZ word list  (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of words of a firm 
in the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference between the 
maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is defined at 
Fama-French 48 industries level. 
HPS HEDGE STD 
Number of words from the HPS word list  (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of words of a firm in 
the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference between the 
maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is defined at 
Fama-French 48 industries level. 
FX HEDGE STD 
Number of words from the foreign exchange (FX) word list  (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of 
words of a firm in the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference 
between the maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is 
defined at Fama-French 48 industries level. 
IR HEDGE STD 
Number of words from the interest rate (IR) word list  (defined in Appendix 2) minus the number of words 
of a firm in the same industry-year with the minimum words count, all divided by the difference between 
the maximum and minimum number of words firms in the same industry-year have. Industry is defined at 
Fama-French 48 industries level. 
NOTION/AT 
Absolute values of the sum of net hedging positions in interest rate hedging, foreign currency hedging and 
commodity hedging, all scaled by total assets (item # 6). The net position is the difference between each 
firm's long and short positions in interest rate, currency and commodity respectively.  A long (short) 
interest  rate position is one that benefits from rising (declining) interest rates. A long (short) currency 
derivative position benefits from price increases (decreases) of a currency other than the U.S. dollar. A 
long (short) commodity position is one that benefits from rising (declining) commodity prices. 
AFTERLAW Dummy equal to one for observations from 2003 onwards 
TREATED 
Non-compliant board dummy equals one if the board does not have a majority of independent directors in 
2002. Board independence is based on the IRRC classification. 
FIN EXP 
TREATED 
Dummy equals one if none of the audit committee members of the board of directors is classified as a 
financial expert in 2002. A financial expert is defined as having any of the following titles in the bio 
disclosure in the proxy statement: "Chief Financial Officer" "CPA" "Certified Public Accountant" 
"Auditor" "auditor" "Comptroller" "Controller" "controller" "comptroller" "financial analyst" "Financial 
Analyst" "Investment Banker" "Banker" "banker" "CFA" "Certified Financial Analyst" "finance" 
“Finance" "CEO" "Chief Executive Officer" "chairman of the board" "Chairman of the Board".  
HHI 







 , where ijtS is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t . Market shares are 
computed from Compustat based on firms‟ sales (item #12) and industry is defined at the three-digit  SIC 
level. 
LOG FIRMAGE Log of firm age, where firm age is the number of years since the firm is first  listed in the CRSP database. 
LOG ASSETS Log of total asset (item #6). 
TOBIN'S Q 
Tobin‟s Q‟ is the market value of equity (item #25 multiplied by item # 199)  plus the book value of assets 
(item #6) minus the sum of book value of common equity (item #60) and deferred taxes (item # 74), all 
divided by the book value of assets (item #6). 
ROA 
Log of one plus ROA, where ROA is net income (item # 172) plus extraordinary items and discontinued 
operation (item # 48), all divided by lagged asset (item #6). 
STOCK RETURN Log of one plus fiscal year stock return. 
NUMBER OF 
SEGMENTS 
Number of different business segments from Compustat Segment database at the four-digit  SIC industry 
level. 
D(SEGMENT>1) Dummy equal to one if a firm has more than one business segment in different four-digit  SIC industries. 
CASH/SALES Cash (item #1) divided by sales (item #12). 
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LEVERAGE Short term debt  (item #34) plus long term debt (item #142) divided by total asset (item #6). 
CAPEX/ASSETS Capital expenditure (item #128) scaled by total asset (item # 6). 
R&D/ASSETS R&D expenditure (item # 46) scaled by total asset (item # 6). 
TOTAL RISK Variance of  daily stock returns over one calendar year. 
MARKET RISK-
VALUE 
Variance of market return. For each stock each year, we regress daily stock returns on the CRSP value-
weighted market index to estimate the beta of a stock. Variance of the market return is calculated as beta 
squared multiplied by the variance of the value-weighted market index over a year. 
IDIO RISK-
VALUE 




Variance of market return. For each stock each year, we regress daily stock returns on the CRSP equal-
weighted market index to estimate the beta of a stock. Variance of the market return is calculated as beta 
squared multiplied by the variance of the equal-weighted market index over a calendar year. 
IDIO RISK-
EQUAL 
Variance of the residual from a regression of daily stock returns on the CRSP equal-weighted market 
index. 
IDIO-CARHART 
Variance of residual from Frama-French-Carhart four factor model. For each stock each year, we regress 
daily stock returns on the four-factor model and we take the variance of the residuals from the regression. 
Daily factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French data library.  
LOG 
WORDCOUNT 
Log of total word count from 10-K filing. 
TONE 
(Total number of positive word-Total number of negative word)/(Total number of positive word+Total 
number of negative word)*100, where positiveness (negativeness) of a word is defined using the 
dictionary created by Loughran and Macdonald (2011). 
HIGH EQUITY 
Dummy equals one if  a CEO has an above median level of stock ownership in  2002. CEO stock 
ownership is obtained from Execucomp and is defined as number of shares owned (  Execucomp variable 
shrown_excl_opts) divided by total number of shares outstanding (item # 25). 
LOW EQUITY Dummy is one if CEO has below median level of stock ownership as at  2002 
HEDGING NEED 
As of 2002, we sort Fama-French 10 industries based on hedging measures and  the top five industries are 
classified as hedging need industries 
NO HEDGING 
NEED 
As of 2002, we sort Fama-French 10 industries based on hedging measures and  the bottom five industries 
are classified as hedging need industries 
BACKDATE 
Dummy equals one if company awards lucky grant to directors any time prior to 2002. Lucky grants are 
defined as in Bebchuk et al (2010). 
NO BACKDATE 
Dummy equals one if company does not award lucky grants to directors any time prior to 2002. Lucky 
grants are defined as in Bebchuk et al (2010). 
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Appendix 2 Hedging Word Lists 
This appendix provides a list  of hedging-related words we search in companies annual 10-K filings over our sample period. 
 
HPS Hedging Word List   CLMZ Hedging Word List  
American style  derivative 
cash flow hedg  hedg 
cashflow hedg  financial instrument 
commodity price risk   swap 
credit exposure  market risk 
credit risk    expos 
derivative  futures 
derivative portfolio  forward contract 
derivative positions  forward exchange 
derivatives   option contract 
documented hedging strategy  risk management 
effectiveness of hedg  notional 
European style   
expos  Risk Policy Word List  
fair value risk  hedge accounting 
fair value hedg  hedge accounting treatment 
financial derivative   hedging program 
financial instrument  hedging strategy 
forward  risk management 
forward contract  risk management policy 
forward exchange  risk officer 
futures  risk committee 
hedg  risk management officer 
hedge effectiveness  risk management committee 
hedging activities  Risk Oversight  
hedging effectiveness  risk oversight function 
insurance against   risk oversight function of the Board 
interest rate risk   risk management program 
manage credit risk  enterprise risk management 
manage market risk   enterprise risk management program 
market price risk   
market risk   Foreign Exchange Hedging Word List  
notional  foreign exchange forward 
offsetting position  forward foreign exchange 
option contract  foreign exchange rate forward 
Reduce volatility   currency forward 
risk exposure  currency rate forward 
straddle  foreign exchange option 
swap  currency option 
swap agreements  oreign exchange rate option 
swaps  currency rate option 
underlying markets  foreign exchange future 
  currency future 
  foreign exchange rate future 
Interest Rate Hedging Word List  currency rate future 
interest rate swap  foreign exchange swap 
interest rate cap  currency swap 
interest rate collar  foreign exchange rate swap 
interest rate floor  currency rate swap 
interest rate forward  foreign exchange cap 
interest rate option  currency cap 
interest rate future  foreign exchange rate cap 
  currency rate cap 
  foreign exchange collar 
  currency collar 
  Foreign exchange rate collar 
  currency rate collar 
  Foreign exchange floor 
  currency floor 
  Foreign exchange rate floor 






Table 1  
Univariate Statistics 
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for cash flow hedging measure where the sample period starts 
from 2001. We report the number of observations, the mean, median, standard deviation, 25th and 75th percentile. 
In panel B, we report means per industry where industries are defined using the Fama-French 10 classification. 
Panel C also reports variable means of treated versus control firms. Treated firms are firms which did not have a 
majority of independent directors on their board in 2002. Board independence information is from IRRC. D (CF 
HEDGE) is a dummy equal to one if firms report cash flow hedging. All the other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Hedging related words are defined in Appendix 2. 
Panel A Hedging Variables 
 
N Mean Median Std p25 p75 
 
CLMZ HEDGE(%) 6968 0.177 0.135 0.141 0.068 0.263 
 
HPS HEDGE(%) 6968 0.270 0.220 0.193 0.124 0.391 
 
RISK POLICY(%) 6968 0.007 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.009 
 
IR HEDGE(%) 6968 0.009 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.010 
 
FX HEDGE(%) 6968 0.004 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.005 
 
CLMZ HEDGE STD 6766 0.161 0.098 0.170 0.034 0.241 
 
HPS HEDGE STD 6766 0.178 0.121 0.174 0.046 0.266 
 
RISK POLICY STD 6766 0.080 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.091 
 
IR HEDGE STD 6766 0.099 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.111 
 
FX HEDGE STD 6766 0.087 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.091 
 
NOTION/AT 2084 0.050 0.022 0.067 0.000 0.078 
 
CF HEDGE/AT(%) 4727 0.145 0.000 0.299 0.000 0.000 
 
D(CF HEDGE) 4727 0.162 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.000 
 
WORDCOUNT 6968 23838 19736 20345 10372 30877 
 
Panel B Hedging  by Industries 















Consumer Nondurables 0.198 0.258 0.202 0.300 0.010 0.004 0.079 
Consumer Durables 0.164 0.241 0.191 0.289 0.014 0.006 0.071 
Manufacturing 0.140 0.231 0.210 0.312 0.012 0.007 0.082 
Oil, Gas and Coal 0.387 0.250 0.276 0.393 0.008 0.002 0.087 
Business Equipment 0.104 0.131 0.158 0.254 0.005 0.007 0.071 
Telephone and Television 0.225 0.037 0.093 0.159 0.007 0.001 0.086 
Wholesale and retail 0.118 0.092 0.141 0.220 0.012 0.003 0.079 
Healthcare and Medical 0.148 0.097 0.123 0.196 0.007 0.003 0.093 
Utilit ies 0.332 0.259 0.260 0.365 0.006 0.001 0.047 
Other 0.134 0.135 0.185 0.286 0.011 0.002 0.072 
Panel C Control Variables 
 
N Mean Median Std Treated Control 
 
TREATED DUMMY 6969 0.238 0.000 0.426 
   
AFTERLAW 6968 0.455 0.000 0.498 0.455 0.456 
 
HHI 6969 0.178 0.122 0.160 0.177 0.181 *** 
LOG FIRMAGE 6969 3.014 3.045 0.775 3.085 2.789 *** 
LOG ASSETS 6969 7.444 7.298 1.562 7.563 7.082 * 
TOBIN'S Q 6969 2.103 1.572 2.028 2.076 2.187 *** 
ROA 6969 0.049 0.055 0.137 0.046 0.059 *** 
ROA(t-1) 6969 0.050 0.057 0.147 0.047 0.059 
 
STOCK RETURN 6969 0.067 0.090 0.415 0.066 0.069 
 
Panel D Operating Hedging Variables 
 
N Mean Median Std p25 p75 
 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS 6969 1.950 1.000 1.249 1.000 3.000 
 
CASH/SALES 6969 0.209 0.067 0.380 0.020 0.307 
 
LEVERAGE 6969 0.219 0.215 0.164 0.071 0.334 
 
CAPEX/ASSETS 6969 0.057 0.042 0.055 0.024 0.071 
 
R&D/ASSETS 6969 0.030 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.039 
 
Panel E Risk Measures 
 
N Mean Median Std p25 p75 
 
TOTAL RISK (%) 6968 8.889 5.660 9.758 3.209 10.595 
 
MARKET RISK-VALUE (%) 6968 1.593 0.869 2.445 0.396 1.761 
 
IDIO RISK-VALUE (%) 6968 7.325 4.570 8.215 2.452 9.056 
 
MARKET RISK-EQUAL (%) 6968 1.584 0.835 2.457 0.370 1.754 
 
IDIO RISK-EQUAL(%) 6968 7.334 4.600 8.100 2.531 8.996 
 




Table 2  
Board Independence and Hedging 
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample period starts in 2001. Columns 1-7, and 9-10, are firm- and industry-year joint fixed 
effects regressions. Column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All 
monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and 
pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES CF HEDGE/AT CLMZ HEDGE HPS HEDGE CLMZ HEDGE STD HPS HEDGE STD IR HEDGE STD FX HEDGE STD D(HPS HIGH) NOTIONAL/AT RISK POLICY 
                  
  AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.031 -0.017 -0.027 -0.022 -0.024 -0.036 -0.022 -0.239 -0.014 0.002 
 
(-1.897)* (-2.764)*** (-3.123)*** (-3.012)*** (-3.070)*** (-2.886)*** (-2.393)** (-1.894)* (-1.750)* (2.391)** 
HHI -0.186 -0.025 -0.044 -0.009 0.000 -0.000 -0.106 -0.268 -0.037 0.002 
 
(-1.493) (-0.688) (-0.949) (-0.216) (0.005) (-0.005) (-1.777)* (-1.198) (-1.120) (0.472) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.074 0.001 -0.003 -0.017 -0.025 0.012 0.022 -0.362 0.007 0.000 
 
(-2.181)** (0.086) (-0.249) (-1.201) (-1.699)* (0.887) (1.459) (-8.045)*** (1.478) (0.341) 
LOG ASSETS 0.048 0.005 0.006 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.020 0.272 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(2.494)** (1.002) (0.840) (2.753)*** (2.727)*** (1.308) (2.183)** (11.858)*** (-0.521) (-0.808) 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.059 0.001 0.000 
 
(-0.210) (-0.316) (-0.143) (-0.724) (-1.081) (-0.328) (0.264) (2.282)** (0.480) (0.981) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.078 -0.030 -0.038 -0.003 -0.001 -0.098 0.082 -1.415 0.059 -0.009 
 
(0.480) (-0.880) (-0.789) (-0.082) (-0.027) (-1.632) (1.705)* (-2.284)** (1.613) (-2.485)** 
TOBIN'S Q 0.016 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.014 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(2.103)** (-0.654) (-0.456) (0.598) (1.107) (1.287) (0.136) (0.959) (-1.251) (-1.608) 
LEVERAGE 0.080 0.029 0.039 0.053 0.063 0.108 0.017 1.699 0.089 -0.001 
 
(1.343) (1.893)* (1.899)* (2.869)*** (3.228)*** (3.743)*** (0.685) (8.309)*** (3.729)*** (-0.552) 
CASH/SALES -0.015 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 -0.013 0.001 -0.008 0.183 -0.018 -0.000 
 
(-0.679) (-2.402)** (-2.385)** (-1.844)* (-1.817)* (0.125) (-0.714) (2.085)** (-1.953)* (-0.338) 
ROA 0.062 0.011 0.017 -0.016 -0.024 -0.010 -0.007 -0.671 0.011 0.001 
 
(2.021)** (1.570) (1.706)* (-1.535) (-2.148)** (-0.716) (-0.575) (-2.963)*** (0.738) (0.800) 
ROA(t-1) 0.001 0.009 0.010 -0.007 -0.011 -0.003 0.000 -0.447 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.049) (1.495) (1.217) (-0.715) (-1.023) (-0.277) (0.050) (-2.170)** (0.319) (1.042) 
STOCK RETURN 0.033 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.026 0.001 -0.001 
 
(3.094)*** (-0.116) (-0.271) (0.519) (0.758) (0.847) (0.305) (0.368) (0.153) (-1.730)* 
TREATED 
       
0.096 
  
        
(1.065) 
  
           OBSERVATIONS 4,727 6,968 6,968 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,955 2,084 6,968 
R-SQUARED 0.674 0.719 0.715 0.717 0.715 0.603 0.673 0.155 0.591 0.674 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLUSTER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3 Robustness 
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample 
period starts from 2001. Coefficients of firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions are reported. In 
panel B, column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 
48 industries are used.  All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. Panel A tests the parallel trend assumption. 
The treated dummy variable equals one if the firm does not have a majority of independent directors in 2002 using 
the IRRC definition. The treatment dummy is interacted with year dummies. The holdout group is year 2002. Panel 
B regresses hedging variables on the afterlaw*treatment dummy along with all the fixed effects, but excludes other 
control variables. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the 
regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity -robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-
/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A Parallel Trend Assumption 
















        
 SOX(t<=-4)*TREATED 
 
0.011 0.021 0.011 0.015 0.006 
  
(1.169) (1.528) (0.965) (1.353) (0.557) 
SOX(t-3)*TREATED 
 
0.006 0.016 0.013 0.016 -0.006 
  
(0.628) (1.259) (1.160) (1.418) (-0.555) 
SOX(t-2)*TREATED 
 
-0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
  
(-0.388) (-0.180) (-0.655) (-0.592) (-0.368) 
SOX(t-1)*TREATED 0.016 -0.010 -0.011 -0.017 -0.016 0.002 
 
(0.752) (-1.204) (-0.939) (-1.527) (-1.550) (0.218) 
SO X(t+1)*TREATED -0.034 -0.012 -0.016 -0.022 -0.023 -0.011 
 
(-1.664)* (-1.480) (-1.377) (-2.190)** (-2.255)** (-0.975) 
SO X(t>=2)*TREATED -0.028 -0.023 -0.032 -0.020 -0.020 -0.016 
 
(-1.663)* (-3.072)*** (-3.103)*** (-2.194)** (-2.083)** (-1.741)* 
HHI -0.185 -0.025 -0.043 -0.009 -0.001 -0.036 
 
(-1.687)* (-0.837) (-1.107) (-0.279) (-0.021) (-1.241) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.073 0.001 -0.003 -0.017 -0.025 0.008 
 
(-2.923)*** (0.168) (-0.270) (-1.489) (-2.095)** (1.319) 
LOG ASSETS 0.048 0.005 0.006 0.019 0.020 -0.003 
 
(3.008)*** (1.282) (1.074) (3.430)*** (3.407)*** (-0.670) 
NUMBER OF 
SEGMENTS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 
 
(-0.163) (-0.379) (-0.179) (-0.877) (-1.311) (0.428) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.084 -0.030 -0.037 -0.002 0.000 0.062 
 
(0.709) (-0.988) (-0.856) (-0.056) (0.009) (1.710)* 
TOBIN'S Q 0.016 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 
 
(2.309)** (-0.752) (-0.528) (0.600) (1.174) (-1.561) 
LEVERAGE 0.079 0.029 0.040 0.053 0.063 0.089 
 
(1.770)* (2.252)** (2.250)** (3.380)*** (3.809)*** (5.954)*** 
CASH/SALES -0.015 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 -0.013 -0.018 
 
(-0.725) (-2.834)*** (-2.813)*** (-2.092)** (-2.042)** (-2.158)** 
ROA 0.061 0.011 0.017 -0.016 -0.023 0.012 
 
(1.828)* (1.536) (1.637) (-1.779)* (-2.379)** (0.832) 
ROA(t-1) 0.001 0.008 0.009 -0.007 -0.011 0.004 
 
(0.020) (1.373) (1.105) (-0.785) (-1.092) (0.299) 
STOCK RETURN 0.033 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 
(3.077)*** (-0.103) (-0.233) (0.509) (0.737) (0.137) 
       OBSERVATIONS 4,727 6,968 6,968 6,766 6,766 2,084 
R-SQUARED 0.578 0.660 0.656 0.656 0.653 0.436 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLUSTER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3 Robustness (continued) 
 
Panel B Bad Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES CF HEDGE/AT CLMZ HEDGE HPS HEDGE CLMZ HEDGE STD HPS HEDGE STD IR HEDGE STD FX HEDGE STD D(HPS HIGH) RISK POLICY NOTIONAL/AT 
                    
 AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.032 -0.017 -0.027 -0.022 -0.023 -0.035 -0.021 -0.217 0.002 -0.013 
 
(-2.006)** (-2.727)*** (-3.115)*** (-2.956)*** (-3.051)*** (-2.809)*** (-2.239)** (-1.770)* (2.417)** (-2.104)** 
TREATED 
       
0.011 
  
        
(0.122) 
             OBSERVATIONS 4,727 6,968 6,968 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,955 6,968 2,084 
R-SQUARED 0.669 0.718 0.715 0.716 0.713 0.600 0.672 0.118 0.674 0.576 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 4  
Changes in Business and Financial Risk 
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006.  Coefficients of firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions are reported. Column 2 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with 
industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. All the variables are defined under Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but 
not reported in the regressions.  t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES NUMBER OF SEGMENTS D(SEGMENT>1) CASH/SALES LEVERAGE CAPEX/ASSETS R&D/ASSETS 
              
AFTERLAW*TREATED 0.038 0.271 -0.009 -0.010 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.968) (1.080) (-0.692) (-1.420) (-0.226) (1.203) 
HHI 0.032 1.847 -0.029 -0.044 0.029 0.000 
 (0.147) (1.518) (-0.779) (-1.316) (1.933)* (0.112) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.006 -0.137 -0.031 0.004 -0.018 0.003 
 (-0.103) (-0.576) (-1.949)* (0.525) (-4.139)*** (2.156)** 
LOG ASSETS 0.254 1.594 0.003 0.057 0.007 -0.012 
 (6.573)*** (7.935)*** (0.177) (7.261)*** (2.515)** (-7.626)*** 
TOBIN'S Q 0.002 -0.016 -0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.000 
 (0.655) (-0.297) (-0.208) (-2.052)** (2.175)** (0.794) 
ROA -0.114 -1.766 0.041 -0.068 0.021 -0.027 
 (-2.281)** (-3.081)*** (1.031) (-2.233)** (2.566)** (-2.988)*** 
ROA(t-1) -0.084 -0.323 -0.034 -0.064 0.019 -0.003 
 (-1.819)* (-0.712) (-0.649) (-2.806)*** (2.703)*** (-0.874) 
STOCK RETURN 0.019 0.000 -0.014 0.010 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.997) (0.003) (-1.708)* (2.324)** (-4.074)*** (1.338) 
       
OBSERVATIONS 6,969 2,255 6,969 6,969 6,969 6,969 
R-SQUARED 0.811 0.0827 0.794 0.753 0.636 0.910 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5 Board Independence and Equity Volatility 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. Coefficients of firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions are reported. The dependent variable in column 1 is total risk. Column 2 (3) reports the systematic 
(idiosyncratic) volatility regression using the value-weighted CRSP index as the market return. Column 4 (5) reports the systematic (idiosyncratic) volatility regression using the equal-weighted CRSP index as the 
market return.  Column 6 reports idiosyncratic volatility using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. „Lagged Risk‟ is the lagged volatility measure of corresponding dependent variable in that column. All the 
other variables are defined under Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES LOG TOTAL RISK LOG MARKET RISK-VALUE LOG IDIO RISK-VALUE LOG MARKET RISK-EQUAL LOG IDIO RISK-EQUAL LOG IDIO RISK-CARHART 
              
AFTERLAW*TREATED 0.049 0.019 0.056 0.017 0.051 0.048 
 (2.352)** (0.422) (2.706)*** (0.410) (2.452)** (2.328)** 
LOG WORDCOUNT 0.036 0.045 0.031 0.062 0.034 0.040 
 (3.111)*** (2.017)** (2.516)** (2.869)*** (2.727)*** (3.177)*** 
TONE -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-4.018)*** (-1.510) (-4.354)*** (-1.305) (-4.350)*** (-3.905)*** 
HHI -0.005 0.463 -0.073 0.404 -0.067 -0.185 
 (-0.039) (1.451) (-0.540) (1.370) (-0.493) (-1.452) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.062 -0.138 -0.056 -0.257 -0.052 -0.061 
 (-1.794)* (-1.925)* (-1.579) (-4.400)*** (-1.469) (-1.736)* 
LOG ASSETS -0.062 0.062 -0.076 0.082 -0.078 -0.089 
 (-3.025)*** (1.295) (-3.807)*** (1.886)* (-3.934)*** (-4.495)*** 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.012 0.002 0.003 
 (0.021) (-0.072) (0.041) (-0.679) (0.183) (0.309) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.001 0.281 -0.080 0.382 -0.086 -0.105 
 (0.006) (0.821) (-0.499) (1.194) (-0.532) (-0.652) 
TOBIN'S Q 0.005 0.068 0.000 0.048 0.001 -0.001 
 (1.479) (2.842)*** (0.080) (2.378)** (0.263) (-0.207) 
LEVERAGE 0.214 -0.199 0.267 -0.076 0.260 0.257 
 (3.435)*** (-1.428) (4.149)*** (-0.594) (4.058)*** (4.030)*** 
CASH/SALES -0.018 0.021 -0.021 0.005 -0.024 -0.023 
 (-0.587) (0.319) (-0.642) (0.085) (-0.737) (-0.707) 
ROA -0.201 -0.043 -0.351 -0.185 -0.241 -0.355 
 (-2.877)*** (-0.299) (-4.855)*** (-1.406) (-3.319)*** (-4.885)*** 
ROA(t-1) -0.077 -0.109 -0.061 -0.078 -0.083 -0.061 
 (-2.052)** (-1.448) (-1.513) (-1.193) (-2.212)** (-1.539) 
LAGGED RISK 0.345 0.125 0.328 0.118 0.328 0.326 
 (25.269)*** (8.156)*** (23.934)*** (7.935)*** (23.622)*** (23.653)*** 
STOCK RETURN -0.051 -0.117 -0.040 -0.127 -0.037 -0.042 
 (-3.313)*** (-3.191)*** (-2.514)** (-3.940)*** (-2.340)** (-2.710)*** 
       
OBSERVATIONS 6,835 6,791 6,847 6,794 6,838 6,845 
R-SQUARED 0.832 0.632 0.834 0.679 0.830 0.832 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 43 
Table 6 Financial Expertise 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample period starts in 2001. Columns 1-7, and 9-10, are firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions. 
Column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. The treated dummy equals one if the firm does not have a majority of independent 
directors in 2002 using the IRRC definition. The financial expert treated dummy (FIN EXP TREATED) is equal to one if in 2002 a firm does not have a financial expert on the audit committee of the board. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions.  t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 






















            
  
      
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.031 -0.018 -0.027 -0.022 -0.024 -0.036 -0.023 -0.240 -0.014 0.002 
 
(-1.905)* (-2.774)*** (-3.122)*** (-3.008)*** (-3.060)*** (-2.872)*** (-2.458)** (-1.896)* (-1.741)* (2.402)** 
AFTERLAW*FIN EXP 
TREATED 0.009 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.020 0.081 0.006 -0.000 
 
(0.542) (0.222) (-0.115) (0.124) (-0.079) (-0.257) (1.211) (0.429) (0.432) (-0.665) 
HHI -0.185 -0.025 -0.044 -0.008 0.000 -0.001 -0.103 -0.304 -0.037 0.002 
 
(-1.482) (-0.682) (-0.953) (-0.211) (0.002) (-0.013) (-1.732)* (-1.354) (-1.146) (0.458) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.074 0.001 -0.003 -0.017 -0.025 0.012 0.022 -0.362 0.007 0.000 
 
(-2.187)** (0.083) (-0.247) (-1.203) (-1.699)* (0.890) (1.444) (-8.060)*** (1.450) (0.348) 
LOG ASSETS 0.048 0.005 0.006 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.020 0.267 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(2.493)** (1.001) (0.841) (2.751)*** (2.726)*** (1.308) (2.182)** (11.613)*** (-0.537) (-0.807) 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.060 0.001 0.000 
 
(-0.215) (-0.312) (-0.145) (-0.720) (-1.081) (-0.333) (0.302) (2.324)** (0.468) (0.974) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.076 -0.031 -0.038 -0.003 -0.001 -0.098 0.079 -1.455 0.058 -0.009 
 
(0.468) (-0.884) (-0.782) (-0.086) (-0.024) (-1.619) (1.644) (-2.349)** (1.571) (-2.460)** 
TOBIN'S Q 0.016 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.013 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(2.105)** (-0.654) (-0.456) (0.598) (1.106) (1.287) (0.139) (0.877) (-1.264) (-1.608) 
LEVERAGE 0.080 0.029 0.039 0.053 0.063 0.108 0.018 1.680 0.089 -0.001 
 
(1.344) (1.901)* (1.896)* (2.868)*** (3.223)*** (3.732)*** (0.733) (8.209)*** (3.719)*** (-0.565) 
CASH/SALES -0.015 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 -0.013 0.001 -0.008 0.188 -0.018 -0.000 
 
(-0.682) (-2.411)** (-2.386)** (-1.846)* (-1.815)* (0.129) (-0.737) (2.144)** (-1.979)** (-0.330) 
ROA 0.062 0.011 0.017 -0.016 -0.024 -0.010 -0.007 -0.660 0.011 0.001 
 
(2.021)** (1.575) (1.704)* (-1.534) (-2.148)** (-0.719) (-0.551) (-2.915)*** (0.726) (0.792) 
ROA(t-1) 0.001 0.009 0.010 -0.007 -0.011 -0.003 0.001 -0.431 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.053) (1.499) (1.212) (-0.713) (-1.023) (-0.282) (0.089) (-2.100)** (0.323) (1.031) 
STOCK RETURN 0.033 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.027 0.001 -0.001 
 
(3.097)*** (-0.112) (-0.272) (0.521) (0.756) (0.844) (0.328) (0.392) (0.150) (-1.738)* 
TREATED 
       
0.100 
  
        
(1.113) 
  FIN EXP TREATED 
       
-0.389 
  
        
(-2.862)*** 
             OBSERVATIONS 4,727 6,968 6,968 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,955 2,084 6,968 
R-SQUARED 0.674 0.719 0.715 0.717 0.715 0.603 0.674 0.156 0.591 0.674 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLUSTER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7 Financial Expertise: Triple Interaction 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample period starts in 2001. Columns 1-7, and 9-10, are firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions. 
Column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. The treated dummy equals one if the firm does not have a majority of independent 
directors in 2002 using the IRRC definition. The financial expert treated dummy (FIN EXP TREATED) is equal to one if in 2002 a firm does not have a financial expert on the audit committee of the board. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions.  t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  






















          
    
    
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.035 -0.015 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.034 -0.029 -0.242 -0.058 0.001 
 
(-1.929)* (-2.243)** (-2.644)*** (-3.153)*** (-3.178)*** (-2.536)** (-3.137)*** (-1.854)* (-2.510)** (2.101)** 
AFTERLAW*FIN EXP TREATED -0.000 0.009 0.006 -0.007 -0.009 0.000 0.004 0.076 0.022 -0.001 
 
(-0.020) (0.926) (0.457) (-0.633) (-0.799) (0.011) (0.206) (0.363) (1.310) (-0.693) 
AFTERLAW*TREATED*FIN EXP 
TREATED 0.032 -0.026 -0.027 0.029 0.029 -0.012 0.055 0.020 -0.009 0.001 
 
(0.947) (-1.116) (-0.905) (1.496) (1.525) (-0.491) (1.420) (0.065) (-1.057) (0.416) 
HHI -0.186 -0.025 -0.044 -0.008 0.000 -0.001 -0.103 -0.304 -0.041 0.002 
 
(-1.490) (-0.689) (-0.958) (-0.211) (0.001) (-0.013) (-1.737)* (-1.352) (-1.264) (0.459) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.075 0.001 -0.003 -0.018 -0.026 0.013 0.021 -0.362 0.007 0.000 
 
(-2.207)** (0.141) (-0.201) (-1.256) (-1.746)* (0.911) (1.334) (-8.053)*** (1.440) (0.335) 
LOG ASSETS 0.048 0.005 0.006 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.020 0.267 -0.004 -0.001 
 
(2.498)** (0.984) (0.828) (2.770)*** (2.743)*** (1.303) (2.219)** (11.600)*** (-0.634) (-0.805) 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.060 0.001 0.000 
 
(-0.202) (-0.324) (-0.154) (-0.714) (-1.075) (-0.335) (0.312) (2.325)** (0.358) (0.975) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.077 -0.031 -0.038 -0.003 -0.000 -0.098 0.080 -1.455 0.060 -0.009 
 
(0.473) (-0.900) (-0.794) (-0.072) (-0.010) (-1.623) (1.663)* (-2.349)** (1.662)* (-2.455)** 
TOBIN'S Q 0.016 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.013 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(2.125)** (-0.699) (-0.490) (0.664) (1.164) (1.261) (0.207) (0.877) (-1.291) (-1.595) 
LEVERAGE 0.080 0.029 0.040 0.053 0.063 0.108 0.017 1.680 0.088 -0.001 
 
(1.341) (1.919)* (1.910)* (2.847)*** (3.204)*** (3.737)*** (0.703) (8.210)*** (3.702)*** (-0.570) 
CASH/SALES -0.015 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 -0.013 0.001 -0.008 0.188 -0.019 -0.000 
 
(-0.677) (-2.407)** (-2.384)** (-1.855)* (-1.823)* (0.131) (-0.747) (2.144)** (-2.024)** (-0.331) 
ROA 0.061 0.011 0.017 -0.016 -0.024 -0.010 -0.007 -0.660 0.011 0.001 
 
(1.973)** (1.615) (1.731)* (-1.555) (-2.164)** (-0.709) (-0.602) (-2.915)*** (0.738) (0.785) 
ROA(t-1) 0.001 0.009 0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.004 0.001 -0.431 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.049) (1.472) (1.193) (-0.700) (-1.013) (-0.287) (0.119) (-2.099)** (0.338) (1.035) 
STOCK RETURN 0.033 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.027 0.001 -0.001 
 
(3.066)*** (-0.077) (-0.245) (0.485) (0.722) (0.856) (0.277) (0.390) (0.245) (-1.748)* 
TREATED 
       
0.100 
  
        
(1.113) 
  FIN EXP TREATED 
       
-0.389 
  
        
(-2.861)*** 
             OBSERVATIONS 4,727 6,968 6,968 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,955 2,084 6,968 
R-SQUARED 0.674 0.719 0.716 0.718 0.715 0.603 0.674 0.156 0.593 0.674 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLUSTER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 Hedging Changes and Agency Problems: CEO Equity Holding 
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample period starts in 2001. Columns 1-7, and 9-10, are firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions. 
Column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. High (low) equity dummy is one if CEO has above (below) median level of stock 
ownership in 2002. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  The p-value of an F-test between the 
interaction coefficients (high vs low equity) is reported. 






















                      
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.046 -0.026 -0.039 -0.031 -0.034 -0.047 -0.025 -0.344 -0.027 0.001 
            *HIGH EQ UITY (-3.326)*** (-3.831)*** (-4.053)*** (-3.911)*** (-4.072)*** (-3.648)*** (-2.361)** (-2.487)** (-2.588)*** (1.776)* 
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.014 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.021 -0.016 -0.015 0.009 0.002 
             *LO W EQ UITY (-0.392) (-0.342) (-0.393) (-0.457) (-0.185) (-0.845) (-1.005) (-0.079) (0.716) (1.481) 
HHI -0.035 -0.038 -0.064 -0.018 -0.009 0.007 -0.111 -0.265 -0.037 0.003 
 
(-0.242) (-0.992) (-1.350) (-0.455) (-0.211) (0.099) (-1.803)* (-1.168) (-1.064) (0.517) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.049 0.009 0.010 -0.016 -0.024 0.012 0.022 -0.358 0.009 0.000 
 
(-1.456) (0.953) (0.721) (-1.140) (-1.637) (0.877) (1.439) (-7.702)*** (1.681)* (0.117) 
LOG ASSETS 0.063 0.004 0.005 0.018 0.019 0.012 0.020 0.190 -0.006 -0.001 
 
(2.918)*** (0.836) (0.653) (2.673)*** (2.622)*** (1.168) (2.217)** (7.734)*** (-0.945) (-0.742) 
NUMBER OF 
SEGMENTS 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.049 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.611) (-0.102) (-0.104) (-0.491) (-0.921) (-0.273) (0.330) (1.850)* (0.611) (1.498) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.125 -0.026 -0.033 0.004 0.006 -0.098 0.077 -1.278 0.057 -0.008 
 
(0.742) (-0.743) (-0.679) (0.101) (0.137) (-1.641) (1.617) (-2.057)** (1.518) (-2.231)** 
TOBIN'S Q 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.039 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(1.616) (-0.855) (-0.635) (0.463) (0.960) (1.099) (-0.026) (2.378)** (-1.454) (-1.523) 
LEVERAGE 0.089 0.022 0.030 0.050 0.060 0.104 0.012 1.694 0.094 -0.001 
 
(1.433) (1.459) (1.451) (2.660)*** (2.998)*** (3.584)*** (0.475) (7.994)*** (3.810)*** (-0.451) 
CASH/SALES -0.023 -0.010 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011 0.000 -0.001 0.195 -0.023 0.000 
 
(-0.989) (-1.801)* (-1.770)* (-1.587) (-1.540) (0.009) (-0.114) (2.068)** (-2.476)** (0.056) 
ROA 0.047 0.010 0.017 -0.015 -0.022 -0.003 -0.008 -0.656 0.017 0.001 
 
(1.505) (1.560) (1.756)* (-1.407) (-2.019)** (-0.228) (-0.654) (-2.825)*** (1.130) (0.986) 
ROA(t-1) 0.012 0.009 0.012 -0.006 -0.009 0.001 0.001 -0.616 0.008 0.001 
 
(0.393) (1.568) (1.462) (-0.625) (-0.902) (0.049) (0.083) (-2.738)*** (0.483) (1.037) 
STOCK RETURN 0.031 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.016 0.001 -0.000 
 
(2.811)*** (-0.033) (-0.172) (0.402) (0.695) (0.931) (0.145) (0.233) (0.253) (-1.421) 
TREATED 
       
0.236 
  
        
(2.600)*** 
  HIGH EQUITY 
       
-0.092 
  
        
(-1.389) 
             OBSERVATIONS 3,839 6,607 6,607 6,607 6,607 6,607 6,607 6,607 1,963 6,607 
R-SQUARED 0.724 0.723 0.721 0.720 0.718 0.602 0.676 0.151 0.602 0.660 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLUSTER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-VALUE OF F test  0.37 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.30 0.58 0.09 0.01 0.63 
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Table 9 Hedging Changes and Agency Problems: Lucky Option Grants 
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample period starts in 2001. Columns 1-7, and 9-10, are firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions. 
Column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. Backdate (no backdate) dummy equals one if the company awards (does not award) 
lucky grants to directors any time prior to 2002. Lucky grants are defined following Bebchuk et al. (2010). All the other variables are defined in Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. 
Constants are included but not reported in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The p-value of an F-test between the interaction coefficients (backdate vs no backdate) is reported. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES CF HEDGE/AT CLMZ HEDGE HPS HEDGE CLMZ HEDGE STD HPS HEDGE STD IR HEDGE STD FX HEDGE STD D(HPS HIGH) NOTIONAL/AT RISK POLICY 
          
    
    
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.094 -0.020 -0.034 -0.029 -0.035 0.001 -0.056 -0.117 -0.019 0.002 
              *BACKDATE (-3.024)*** (-2.037)** (-2.597)*** (-2.484)** (-2.968)*** (0.190) (-4.170)*** (-0.345) (-2.062)** (1.818)* 
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.015 -0.007 -0.014 -0.010 -0.011 -0.002 -0.012 -0.310 -0.008 0.001 
            *NO  BACKDATE (-0.756) (-0.921) (-1.248) (-1.046) (-1.082) (-1.159) (-0.956) (-1.199) (-0.916) (1.584) 
HHI -0.137 0.007 -0.012 0.029 0.035 0.010 -0.103 -0.293 -0.031 0.007 
 
(-1.084) (0.164) (-0.231) (0.669) (0.783) (0.764) (-1.527) (-0.751) (-1.046) (1.490) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.158 -0.005 -0.011 -0.042 -0.052 -0.000 0.023 -0.295 -0.005 -0.000 
 
(-2.287)** (-0.469) (-0.681) (-2.775)*** (-3.098)*** (-0.139) (0.992) (-3.499)*** (-0.475) (-0.306) 
LOG ASSETS 0.045 0.006 0.006 0.021 0.021 0.001 0.019 0.268 -0.003 -0.000 
 
(2.173)** (1.224) (0.910) (2.956)*** (2.825)*** (0.508) (1.978)** (6.314)*** (-0.645) (-0.408) 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.555) (-0.313) (-0.211) (-0.168) (-0.474) (0.305) (0.759) (0.359) (0.359) (1.051) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.126 -0.014 -0.015 0.003 0.007 -0.010 0.060 -0.928 0.069 -0.007 
 
(0.726) (-0.390) (-0.289) (0.070) (0.149) (-1.530) (1.180) (-1.000) (1.882)* (-1.859)* 
TOBIN'S Q 0.012 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(1.521) (-0.328) (-0.143) (0.531) (1.027) (0.629) (0.024) (0.062) (-1.632) (-1.412) 
LEVERAGE 0.043 0.018 0.026 0.037 0.048 0.011 0.009 1.575 0.083 -0.002 
 
(0.694) (1.157) (1.225) (1.996)** (2.406)** (3.477)*** (0.363) (4.674)*** (5.343)*** (-0.996) 
CASH/SALES -0.015 -0.013 -0.019 -0.015 -0.016 -0.001 -0.007 0.204 -0.021 -0.000 
 
(-0.614) (-2.279)** (-2.329)** (-2.041)** (-2.082)** (-0.733) (-0.592) (1.397) (-2.433)** (-0.340) 
ROA 0.056 0.011 0.018 -0.017 -0.025 -0.000 -0.012 -0.570 0.007 0.001 
 
(1.798)* (1.656)* (1.831)* (-1.563) (-2.135)** (-0.332) (-0.902) (-2.224)** (0.519) (0.829) 
ROA(t-1) 0.003 0.009 0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.000 0.001 -0.312 -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.094) (1.540) (1.442) (-0.876) (-1.113) (-0.019) (0.098) (-1.461) (-0.029) (0.794) 
STOCK RETURN 0.030 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.050 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(2.649)*** (-0.131) (-0.165) (-0.071) (0.183) (0.313) (-0.264) (0.726) (-0.113) (-1.475) 
TREATED 
       
0.104 
  
        
(0.600) 
  BACKDATE 
       
0.103 
  
        
(0.827) 
             OBSERVATIONS 4,198 6,200 6,200 6,037 6,037 6,037 6,037 6,193 1,917 6,200 
R-SQUARED 0.670 0.733 0.728 0.722 0.717 0.615 0.673 0.155 0.602 0.673 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLUSTER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-VALUE OF F Tests 0.02 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.58 0.36 0.73 
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Table 10 Hedging Changes and Agency Problems: Hedging Need 
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006, except for the cash flow hedging measure (column 1) where the sample period starts in 2001. Columns 1-7, and 9-10, are firm- and industry-year joint fixed effects regressions. 
Column 8 reports marginal effects of a logit regression with industry-year joint fixed effects. Fama-French 48 industries are used. As of 2002, we sort Fama-French 10 industries based on hedging measures and the top 
(bottom) five industries are classified as hedging need (no hedging need) industries. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All monetary values are measured in 2002 dollars. Constants are included but not reported 
in the regressions. t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that  are clustered at the firm and pre-/post-SOX level and reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  The p-value of an F-test between the interaction coefficients (hedging need  vs no hedging need) is reported. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES CF HEDGE/AT CLMZ HEDGE HPS HEDGE CLMZ HEDGE STD HPS HEDGE STD IR HEDGE STD FX HEDGE STD D(HPS HIGH) NOTIONAL/AT RISK POLICY 
          
    
    
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.020 -0.018 -0.025 -0.010 -0.015 -0.039 -0.018 -0.170 -0.007 0.002 
               *HEDGING NEED (-0.892) (-1.466) (-1.486) (-0.780) (-1.049) (-1.360) (-1.340) (-0.996) (-0.685) (1.526) 
AFTERLAW*TREATED -0.036 -0.017 -0.029 -0.029 -0.027 -0.033 -0.027 -0.288 -0.023 0.001 
             *NO  HEDGING NEED (-1.708)* (-2.445)** (-2.895)*** (-3.153)*** (-3.015)*** (-1.600) (-2.175)** (-2.096)** (-1.881)* (1.739)* 
HHI -0.189 -0.025 -0.044 -0.012 -0.001 0.001 -0.107 -0.304 -0.033 0.002 
 
(-1.521) (-0.688) (-0.964) (-0.298) (-0.029) (0.012) (-1.792)* (-1.598) (-0.989) (0.428) 
LOG FIRMAGE -0.074 0.001 -0.003 -0.017 -0.025 0.012 0.022 -0.337 0.007 0.000 
 
(-2.183)** (0.085) (-0.248) (-1.206) (-1.705)* (0.680) (1.461) (-7.783)*** (1.429) (0.321) 
LOG ASSETS 0.048 0.005 0.006 0.018 0.019 0.013 0.020 0.252 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(2.479)** (0.999) (0.831) (2.684)*** (2.728)*** (1.010) (2.175)** (11.574)*** (-0.566) (-0.812) 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.065 0.001 0.000 
 
(-0.220) (-0.315) (-0.146) (-0.751) (-1.107) (-0.266) (0.246) (2.681)*** (0.490) (0.981) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.080 -0.031 -0.038 -0.002 -0.001 -0.098 0.082 -1.323 0.061 -0.009 
 
(0.492) (-0.883) (-0.783) (-0.049) (-0.019) (-1.284) (1.708)* (-2.314)** (1.685)* (-2.479)** 
TOBIN'S Q 0.016 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(2.105)** (-0.653) (-0.459) (0.567) (1.100) (1.074) (0.136) (0.021) (-1.248) (-1.613) 
LEVERAGE 0.080 0.029 0.039 0.053 0.063 0.108 0.017 1.704 0.088 -0.001 
 
(1.340) (1.894)* (1.895)* (2.876)*** (3.218)*** (2.951)*** (0.682) (8.766)*** (3.751)*** (-0.547) 
CASH/SALES -0.014 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 -0.013 0.001 -0.008 0.156 -0.018 -0.000 
 
(-0.670) (-2.406)** (-2.376)** (-1.787)* (-1.787)* (0.091) (-0.715) (1.890)* (-1.998)** (-0.310) 
ROA 0.062 0.011 0.017 -0.016 -0.024 -0.010 -0.007 -0.618 0.011 0.001 
 
(2.025)** (1.569) (1.706)* (-1.540) (-2.152)** (-0.690) (-0.584) (-2.777)*** (0.699) (0.797) 
ROA(t-1) 0.001 0.009 0.010 -0.007 -0.011 -0.003 0.000 -0.425 0.004 0.001 
 
(0.049) (1.495) (1.217) (-0.721) (-1.027) (-0.227) (0.044) (-2.079)** (0.276) (1.042) 
STOCK RETURN 0.033 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.030 0.001 -0.001 
 
(3.090)*** (-0.115) (-0.274) (0.479) (0.744) (0.727) (0.291) (0.433) (0.148) (-1.733)* 
TREATED 
       
0.105 
  
        
(1.201) 
  HEDGING NEED 
       
-0.278 
  
        
(-2.177)** 
             OBSERVATIONS 4,727 6,968 6,968 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,968 2,084 6,968 
R-SQUARED 0.674 0.719 0.715 0.718 0.715 0.603 0.673 0.137 0.591 0.674 
FIRM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
FF48-YEAR JOINT FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLUSTER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-VALUE OF F Tests 0.62 0.98 0.83 0.21 0.50 0.82 0.61 0.50 0.29 0.61 
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Table 11  
Announcement Returns 
 
This table shows event study tests using the window:  February, 1, 2002 – November, 4, 2003. CLMZ, HPS, and 
CF HEDGE represent different hedging measures we use to classify firms into hedgers and non-hedgers. We 
classify firms as hedgers if the ratio of CLMZ (HPS) words to total words in the 10-K is above the sample median 
in 2002 or alternatively if the firm reports cash flow hedges (CF HEDGE). The remaining firms are classified as  
non-hedgers. Panel A reports abnormal stock returns from a difference-in-difference portfolio. For each day, we 
compute the difference in the following portfolio (PF) returns: Abnormal return = (PF [treated firm, hedging]-PF[treated firm, 
non-hedging])- (PF[control firm, hedging]-PF[control firm, non-hedging]).  The cumulative event period abnormal returns are based on 
the average daily abnormal returns multiplied by 444 days in the event window. Panel B shows the results of the 
one, three- and four-factor regression results where the dependent variable is the daily return of the difference-in-
difference portfolio return. The intercept represents the average daily abnormal return. t-statistics are in 




Panel A Portfolio Approach 
  
Average daily 
 AR t-statistic 
Cumulative event 
 period AR 
Market-adjusted Model   
 CLMZ 0.0119% (2.306)** 5.28% 
 HPS 0.0113% (2.276)** 5.03% 
 CF HEDGE 0.0090% (1.826)* 3.97% 
Market Model    
 CLMZ 0.0130% (2.512)** 5.79% 
 HPS 0.0143% (2.893)*** 6.35% 
 CF HEDGE 0.0080% (1.687)* 3.53% 
Fama-French Model   
 CLMZ 0.0125% (2.508)** 5.55% 
 HPS 0.0139% (2.816)*** 6.16% 
 CF HEDGE 0.0076% (1.549) 3.37% 
Carhart four-factor model   
 CLMZ 0.0117% (2.383)** 5.19% 
 HPS 0.0134% (2.705)*** 5.95% 
 CF HEDGE 0.0056% (1.108) 2.46% 
 
Panel B Regression Approach 
  Intercept  t-statistic 
Cumulative event 
 period AR 
CAPM Model    
 CLMZ 0.0116% (2.270)** 5.14% 
 HPS 0.0110% (2.224)** 4.90% 
 CF HEDGE 0.0086% (1.807)* 3.82% 
Fama-French Model   
 CLMZ 0.0102% (2.121)** 4.53% 
 HPS 0.0111% (2.258)** 4.93% 
 CF HEDGE 0.0065% (1.396) 2.87% 
Carhart four-factor model   
 CLMZ 0.0100% (2.086)** 4.46% 
 HPS 0.0104% (2.154)** 4.63% 






   
